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FOREWORD 
Public health is a developing Community  competence.  There  is, as yet,  no 
European  Community  health policy.  References to public health are scattered 
in the European  Community  Treaties and  responsibility for public health 
questions  in the European  Community  Institutions is diffuse. 
Perhaps  the most  frequent  requests for  information and  studies received by  the 
Directorate General  for Studies concern  comparative  studies in various fields 
of the twelve  Member  States of the European  Community. 
In  the  field of public health,  studies exist at national  level and  some  at the 
level  of  international organizations such  as the  WHO  and  the.OECD,  but  not  at 
the  level of the European  C~ity. 
The  following  synthesis of-information provides a basis of comparison  of 
health care systems  in the European  community  Member  States.  The  paper was 
produced  by  Mr  Graham  Chambers  of the Social Affairs,  Environment,  Consumer 
Protection and  Public Health Division to whom  any  enquiries for further 
information should  be  addressed. 
Elfi SCHtiNER 
Director I  N T R 0 D U C T I  0 N 
An  examination of the European  Community  Treaties will confirm that there is 
no  European  health policy - or is there?  A number  of other policies contain 
elements of a  health policy.  Euratom  provides for radiation protection 
measures,  the Coal  and  Steel Treaty for the health protection of workers  in 
those  industries.  In addition,  consumer  protection,  environment  and  research 
all contain elements relating to health. 
Despite  the above-described dispersion of health questions,  there is no  doubt 
that greater interest is being shown  than ever before  in health matters at the 
European  Community  level. 
In practical terms health ministers of the twelve  meet  to discuss matters of 
common  interest.  Common  action is announced  to fight  AIDS  or cancer,  and 
medical  research programmes  are funded  at Community  level.  The  imminent 
arrival of the Single Market  with free movement  of goods  <including foodstuffs 
and  plants>,  people  <and  their pets>  and  services  <including health and 
insurance-related ones>  concentrates European  minds  on  health-related 
questions.  Many  non-tariff barriers to trade are based  on  differing national 
public health provisions. 
Finally,  movement  of people  <principally tourism>  has  given many  Europeans 
their first experience of a health system different to their.own.  Reciprocal 
health care provisions exist between  Community  countries,  and  a  broken  leg on 
-the  ski slopes may  have  given  many  people the opportunity to reflect, at 
leis~e,-:on their own  and  their neighbours health care systems. 
The  foll~wing research paper is a  synthesis of documentation  and  research 
culled from  a variety of sources:  principally,  the OECD  and  the World  Health 
Organization  <European  region>  as well .as  individual Health Ministries. 
The  aim  is to provide  a  concise,  comparative description of health care 
systems  in the European  Community.  Individual overviews of the systems  of 
nine of the Community  countries are provided  in addition. 
Cries of "crisis" in some  Member  States with regard to the funding  of health 
provisions may  obscure  the fact that all European  Community  countries face the 
same  basic problem,  namely  a potentially infinite demand  for health care from 
an  ageing population,  coupled  with a  shrinking tax/contribution base  from 
which  to fund  it. 
It will always  be  the case that health systems will include a  strong local 
element  to take account  of differing health cultures and  traditions,  but  much 
duplication and  waste  can  be  avoided at the level of research,  prevention and 
control.  No  one  system  of health care is perfect,  each has its pros and  cons, 
and  it is hoped  that this document  will assist objective comparison. 
One  important  fact to emerge  is that,  given the differences in health care 
financing  in EC  Member  States  <some  closed-end,  some  open-end>  a  simple 
comparison  of Member  States percentage  GOP  expenditure on  health care is not 
necessarily a  guide  to the quality of health care provision - it may  indeed 
indicate poor value for money  and  costs which  are spiralling out of control. - 3  -
As  mentioned,  it is impossible to say which  system  is the "better" one  - al 
have  theoretical advantages and  disadvantages.  Significant differences 
emerge,  however,  between  demand-driven  and  supply-driven systems.  The 
national health service model  is an  example  of a  demand-driven  system.  On 
positive side it is at least as good  as any  other system for serious medica 
problems,  and  the filtration system  of general practitioners assures adequa 
medical  care while  controll~ng overall costs and reducing over-medication. 
the negative side there is the risk that a  symptom  may  be  missed  unless 
regular medical  examinations are carried out on  patients.  In addition,  tru 
cost appraisal is difficult and  under-funding,  misallocation of resources, 
top-heavy bureaucracy and  inflexibility in some  cases can  lead to excessive 
long  waiting lists for minor  and  sometimes  major  operations. 
A supply-led system,  such  as the health insurance model,  has the advantage 
flexibility and  choice.  The  quality of care can be  very sood  and  patients 
choose  any  specialist they please.  There  are no  waiting lists for operatic 
On  the negative side,  however,  cost control is difficult,  the patients freE 
of choice may  be  illusory - competing  doctors often refuse to pass on  a 
patient's medical  records to a  rival practitioner,  and  where  chanse of doc1 
is frequent  no  adequate medical  record is built up  for the patient.  The 
system also encourages over-medication,  over-prescription and  sometimes 
unnecessary surgery. 
European  systems of health care generally avoid the complete  free-for-all 
which  exists in a totally uncontrolled health care market.  The  kind of 
defensive or law-suit-driven medicine  which  is found  in the United States 
not at all common  in Europe. 
During  the Sung·Dynasty in Imperial China doctors were  paid as lons as the 
patient remained  well.  ·rhe moment  he  or she fell ill, ·the doctor ceased  t< 
remunerated.  It is perhaps no  accident that the tradition of preventive 
medicine is very strong in China.  Some  of today's systems approach that  ic 
·more  closely ~han others, but one  thing is clear:  if costs are to be 
~ontrolled and  ~he·quality of health care maintained and  improved,  prevent. 
rather than cure must  become  the principal pillar of.European health polic· 
G R CHAMBERS - 4  -
DIE  HEALTH  BYsiEMs  OF  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  COUNTRIES 
The  health care systems  of EC  countries are structurally diverse and  based  on 
different underlying philosophical principles.  Despite these differences, 
there are important similarities,  and  most  of the systems  face similar 
financing and  delivery problems due  to structural inefficiencies and  often 
perverse economic  incentives. 
The  systems can be  characterised in a  variety of ways,  none  of which  is 
mutually  exhaustive or wholly  satisfying.  The  most  frequent approach uses 
three basic models: 
i>  National Health Service  <Beveridge>,  characterised by  universal coverage 
national general tax  finan~ing, and  national ownership and/or control of 
the factors of production; 
ii>  Social Insurance  <Bismarck  model>,  characterised by  compulsory  universal 
coverage  generally within the framework  of Social Security,  and  financed 
by  employer  and  individual contributions throush non-profit  insurance 
funds,  and  public and/or private ownership of factors of production;  and 
iii> private insurance  <consumer  sovereignty model>,  characterised·by 
employer-based or individual-purchase of private health insurance 
financed  by  individual and/or employer ·contributions and  private 
ownership  of the factors  ~f production.·. 
Examples  of these systems are:  National Health Service  -~the United  Kingdom, 
Italy;  Social Insurance - France, :·Germany.  Private insurance exists in 
parallel with the above-mentioned  in some  Member  States.· 
!he basic objective of all these systems·is the provision of access to qualit 
care for all citizens while achieving efficiency in the use and  provision of 
services  . 
. .  Financing· 
Financing procedures affect. the redistributive impact of the system,  the 
allocation of resources,  and  overall growth.  Public and  private health care 
financing systems are designed to spread the financial consequences  associatE 
with ill-health over  large population groups.  The  group can  be  the populati< 
of an  entire country,  an  employment-related group,  an  individual  insurance 
fund's membership,  groups of individuals with similar characteristics,  etc. 
In most  EC  countries,  the individual's ability to pay  relative to needs  is 
taken into account  in the establishment of individual contribution levels 
either implicitly  <progressivity of tax systems>  or eXplicitly  <waivers  of 
cost-sharing,  income  related contributions,  spreading additional health care 
costs of pensioners across the entire population>. 
-Health care systems can  be  financed  through general taxes  <personal  income, 
corporate profit,  VAT~  sales>,  specific taxes  <e.g.  excise taxes on  specific 
commodities,  taxes of specific factors of production>,  premiums,  user  charge~ 
<co-insurance  and  deductions>,. and  charitable contributions.  Most  countries 
in fact use·  combinations of these methods,  with countries such as the United 
Kingdom  and  Italy relying heavily on  general taxes,  and  France,  Belgium  and 
Luxembourg  on  payroll taxes. - 5 
Eligibility 
Eligibility criteria differ,  but given the near universal coverage  under 
public and/or private systems  in EC  countries,  the differences are not great 
Most  systems  cover  employees,  their families,  pensioners,  and  disadvantaged 
groups.  There  are differences in eligibility for certain groups  such as 
students,  those never  in the  labour force,  the  long-term unemployed, 
individuals who  can  <or  must>  opt out of the system,  etc.  However,  those no 
covered  under public or private systems can generally receive care in 
publicly-operated health care facilities or through  religious or other 
charitable institutions. 
Benefits 
The  benefits provided by  public and  private health systems also differ. 
Hospital  and  physician inpatient services,  inpatient physician services,  and 
outpatient physician and  diagnostic services are covered under virtually all 
programmes.  For drugs,  eyeglasses,  hearing aids,  nursing homes,  home  health 
and  health-related social services,  there is far more  diversity.  In some 
countries,  such  as  Belgium  and  Ireland,  specific benefits covered  depend  on 
the income  level or employment  status of the individual.  In other countrie5 
such  as Germany,  social service provision is a  regional or local 
responsibility.  In addition,  due  to differences in both policy choices as 
well as differences in medical  practice,  there are differences in the 
conditions under which  certain services are covered  <e.g.  age  restrictions f 
chronic renal dialysis,  exclusion of chronic alcoholics from  liver 
transplants>.  Fundamental  differences can also be  seen in benefits as a 
result of differences in cost-sharing,  on  the part of the patient.  In Franc 
and  Belgium,  cost-sharing.applies to most  services under public programmes. 
In the United  Kingdom,  the Netherlands,  Spain  and  Germany  significant paymer 
for basic services is generally perceived as inconsistent with the underlyir 
social welfare aims  of the public health programmes.  However,  virtually all 
countries impose  cost-sharing on  pharmaceuticals,  with exemptions  for the 
poor.  Some  impose  limits on  cumulative payments  <e.g.  the chronic sick>. 
Moreover,  cost-sharing levels are generally quite nominal. 
All  countries also provide  individual and  collective benefits through their 
public health systems.  All undertake basic public health measures  concernir 
environment,  transmission of contagious diseases,  approval  of pharmaceutical 
medical  research and  education,  immunisation programmes,  pre- and  post-nataJ 
care,  anti-smoking,  drug,  and  alcohol abuse  programmes,  etc. 
The  methods  by  which  medical  care providers are paid for services rendered 
have  a  major  influence on  access,  cost and  quality of care.  Even  in system! 
with closed-end financing  <such  as the NHS  in the UK>,  payment  methods 
influence the allocation of resources within the overall limits,  and  hence  c 
result in differing quantities and  qualities of service being provided  for  1 
same  level of expenditure.  Furthermore,  the actual flows  of funds  themselvE 
contain inherent  incentives for both the demand  and  supply of services.  Thl 
the incentives inherent  in direct reimbursement  systems  such  as those  in 
Germany,  where  the reimbursement  flows  from  the insurance  funds  to medical 
care providers,  may  be  very different from  the  indemnity  approaches  in Belg: 
and  France,  where  the patient pays  the medical  care provider and  is reimbur~ 
by  the  insurance  fund. - 6  -
The  scope of control over the system is of critical importance.  Systems  in 
which  reimbursement  methods  and  levels are coordinated allow  incentives to 
affect the entire system.  Fragmented  systems characterised by  unequal  power 
among  reimbursing entities and  providers are less likely to achieve overall 
objectives of systems  efficiency.  In fact,  this is the very problem  facing 
private health insurers in Europe.  Given  the relatively small sizes of the 
funds,  the large numbers  of providers,  the competitive marketing of policies 
which  necessitates that  insurees have  broad freedom  of choice of provider,  ar 
the extremely  limited share of private insurance in total health spending, 
effective cost containment  in the priyate sector is difficult. 
In attemptins both to control expenditure  increases and  to obtain more 
efficient resource use,  many  countries have  recently modified their 
reimbursement  procedures.  Because  much  of the increase in spending  is due  t< 
increased utilisation and  intensity of services,  considerable emphasis  has 
been placed on  systems that limit quantity and  total expenditure as well  as 
prices. 
Because  hospitals are the largest expenditure  item,  there has been  much 
emphasis  on  hospital payment.  Public systems and  private insurers use a 
variety of methods  to pay  hospitals.  Four different bases are generally use< 
annual  budgets,  payments  per day,  per case,  and  per unit of service. 
Reimbursement  levels can be  established under .a  variety .of  mechanisms: 
unilateral establishment by  public authority,  insurance  carrier~ or provider: 
· negotiation among  various relevant parties;  and  determination by  market  force 
<including competitive bidding>  .•  :·The  resulting pa_yments .can  be-
hospital-specific or apply to groups of  <or  indeed  all> hospitals.  Differen· 
--,  ·:methods·may·'be··'USed :by :different ;payers ·<e.,s.  _public  vs  • .-~ivate>,  and vario' 
:1components  -of. hospitals  <..e.g.  inpatient~ care,. :outpatient ·caN.· -operation 
· costs, :capi-tal ~sts;:1nedical education,- physician :SetY-ices,_._ :e~c. > may  be 
,  -reimbursed  dif.ferently._ ... ;·.  '."  :·;  ··,.._·  rt:;::-,.~:_;·~~  .-.:;1:)_ .  .-·--::~  ":-~  ': 
•'·  ~.-,.  ·_  :·  ··:._  -·  ~  ~:  .  :  . ... ::!,._' ·  ..  ~_  : '·  --~ '·r 
- ·;In :the ·united Kingdom,  Germany  and ·France  (public  -hospi~als>~-,..,the payment  to 
:-ithe-chospital .also .generally includes reimbursement rf~  .. all-_ph_ysician  service: 
·-separation of physician and  hospital payment·often·depends on-whether the 
:hospital is a  public.or private-one.  Private insurance generally reimburses 
hospitals and physicians separately.  -_·;  ·- ~,. _:., ..... : -·  ·:  -~-
-- -~  -.  ·  ·  -~,  · • ·,  - ·  .....  :.--;  .  _::t;..:..:.;>  :- ,_  ~  :·-ir  • ~-~r·'  --~.-' 
· :"nnual' budge'ts ·have ·:the .:advantage ·vi .simplici-ty :and !overall expenditure 
__ ;-'  :-·..:control, r:·but  do not necessarily  ~provide .strong incentives·.:.for-micro-efficien 
-- :  ~  .  or qua 1  i ty <  e .·g.  -the  NHS  in ·the UK.> •  ·  ~- ~Per~d  iem ·payments -also  .. have  the 
·advantage of simplicity  ··and  fewer disincentives than ·slobal budgets from 
· ·qtiantity and ·quality points of ·view;  but since ··per :diem:_payment  systems 
··provide incentives for:·increased  length-.. of- stay per admission, _they  do  not  < 
the absence  of volume  controls>  limit overall expenditure.  Per case  <or 
diagnosis>  payments  have  incentives for reduced  length of stay per case,  but 
also provide  incentives for increased admissions and  possible reductions in 
quality or service intensity per case.  If the payments  do  not adequately 
reflect resource use  <and  implicitly case severity>,  such systems may  also 
provide disincentives to treat complex  cases.  Fee-for-service provides stro 
incentives for service provision and  quality but contains disincentives from 
an  overall expenditure viewpoint  unless accompanied  by  strong volume  control 
thus,  it would  be  expected,  a priori,  that prospective total budget  approach 
inclusive of inpatient physician services such as the British National  Healt 
Service would  result in lower  expenditure than would  a  restrospective per di 
cost or charge-based _system  with physicians being paid on  a 
\ 
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fee-for-service basis.  In  fact,  most  EC  countries have  implemented,  or are 
moving  towards,  either total budget  approaches  <the  United  Kingdom,  France> 
prospective per diem  <Germany>  or per case systems. 
Physician expenditure is are generally the second  largest health expenditur 
category,  and  in their role as the central decision-maker in virtually all 
health systems,  physicians'  decisions affect the great majority of health 
expenditure.  Thus,  the  incentives  inhe~ent in physician payment  systems ar 
critical in determining overall systems costs. 
There  is considerable diversity of physician payment  systems both  among  and 
within most  EC  countries.  The  methods  used  depend  on  the place of service, 
payer category,  speciality of the physician,  geographic  location,  type of 
insurance contract,  physician participation status,  etc.  The  general payme 
methods  employed  are capitation,  salary,  and  variants of fee-for-service  <e 
fee  schedules;  usual,  customary,  and  reasonable charges;  actual charges>,  a 
well as combinations  of these methods.  Payments  by  case are currently unde 
study,  although not  in general use.  Payment  levels and  relative prices  <or 
remuneration>  can  be  established unilaterally or through negotiations amone 
governmental  entities, social insurance funds,  private insurers,  physician~ 
consumers  and/or employers.  Many  countries have  different payment  systems 
hospital-based as opposed  to ambulatory  care physicians.  Some  systems  empl 
ambulatory  care physicians,  usually general practitioners, as "gatekeepersr 
for consumers  to access hospitals, tests, social services,  etc  •. Some  syste 
allow patient freedom  of choice of physician,  while others require individt 
to choose  a  single primary-care physician. 
·cin  Belgium,  France,  Germany  and  Ireland ambulatory physician services are 
generally reimbursed  on  a~ee-for-service basis.  In the United  Kingdom, 
-Spain,  -the  Netherlands  <public  system>., -_and  Denmark  patients select a  G.P. 
their principal physician who  is reimbursed partly on  a  capitation basis. 
Both  reimbursement  procedures and  traditional place of treatment  for 
ambulatory care can have  significant effects both on physician and  on  overc 
-health system ·costs .. · 'In  Germany ·virtually all ambulatory care is provided 
physicians'  private offices.  In Ireland. physicians providing ambulatory  cc 
in hospitals are salaried,  while  those  in private offices are paid on  a 
fee-for-service basis.  In the United  Kingdom,  Germany,  France  <public 
hospitals>  and  Ireland  <public  patients>  physician compensation  is includec 
- ·.'the  hospi1:al ·reimbursement,  and ''Physicians are -generally salaried.  In Frat 
<private hospitals>,  Belgium  and  .Luxembourg  physician services to hospital 
patients are generallyTeimbursed on  a  fee-for-service base.  In France 
<non-convention>  physicians can  charge patients in excess of the establish• 
reimbursement  amounts.  In several countries private insurance is prohibitf 
from  filling in these gaps  <or  the requisite cost-sharing amounts>. Ceneral 
Practitioners 
I  Country 
France 
Italy 
United  lin1doa 
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Aabulatory  Sector 
Fee-for-service 
·Salary  tin  health  centres> 
Capitation  plus 
special  allocations 
Hospital  Sector 
Salary  tpublic  hospitals> 
Fee-for-service 
(private  hospitals) 
Salary 
Capitation  plus  Salary 
fee-for-service  for  certain 
preventive  procedures  plus 
special  allocations 
Ceraany  Fee-for-service  Salary  Cvhen  in  traininl) 
Specialists 
1--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I  France 
I 
I 
I 
·1  Italy 
I 
I 
.1· 
I  United  lin1d01 
I 
-·  . 
I 
·t  Ceraany_ 
~~- I 
- "I 
I 
Fee-for-service 
Salary  tin  health  centres> 
Salary  tin  health  centres> 
Fee-for-service  (private 
offices> 
Salary  plus  fee~for-service 
flfor  hoae  visits 
Fee·f~r-service 
Salary  Cpublic  hospitals) 
Fee-for-service 
(private  hospitals> 
Salary 
Salary 
Fee-for-service 
(private  hospitals> 
Salary  Cthe  rule> 
Fee-for-service,  for 
~  ·patients  treated  by  chiefs 
· of  departaents 
Source  :  Uve  Reinhardt:  Ihe  eo1Rensati~D-tl-2h!liti1Di~lht_EJ2crience Abroad,  Report  prepared  for 
the  U.S.  Health  Care  Financin1  Adainistration,  Uashin1ton  D.C.,  1985. 
Pharmaceuticals are also a  significant expenditure  item.  Reimbursement  is 
senerally on  a  fee-for-service basis. ·  Pharmaceuticals supplied to 
hospitalized individuals are usually considered as part of the-hospital's 
reimbursement.  Fees are established on  the basis of a  number  of criteria, 
including retail price,  wholesale prices,·acquisition costs,  etc. 
Reimbursement  is generally made  to the pharmacist directly or to the patient. 
Increases in,  and  the level of,  pharmaceutical expenditure have  posed  a 
.significant budgetary problem in several·EC countries.  Much  of the activity 
on  pharmaceuticals has centred on  increasing cost-sharing,  substituting 
lower-cost generic equivalents,:.and removing  certain drugs  from  coverage. 
Reimbursement  measures  have  als  been  designed to reduce  payments  either at 
the wholesale or the retail lev 1,  and  in a  limited number  of cases to promo1 
competitive bidding and  bulk  pu.chasing. 
Reimbursement  practices· for nur: ing homes,  home  health services,  hospices, 
other health-related social ser\ices,  and  other health services and  supplies 
differ substantially across cow  ~ies, and·there is a  dearth of reliable ,' 
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comparable  information.  However,  in a  number  of countries coverage  and 
reimbursement  systems  strongly favour  institution-based long-term care 
services over home  and  community-based  care. 
Organisation and  Development of the Delivery System 
The  open- or closed-ended nature of the system fundamentally  affects overal 
costs,  reimbursement  and  quality.  Systems  which  are basically closed-ended 
such  as the National  Health Service  in the United Kingdom  could be  expected 
more  effectively to limit overall health spending than would  systems which 
based heavily on  market  principles.  However,  spending  is only one  dimensio 
of a  health care system,  and  it is also necessary to evaluate the effects o 
quality of care and  health outcomes  and  whether costs are being shifted to 
other governmental  units,  medical  care providers,  or consumers. 
Comparisons  of quality of care are among  the least developed  concepts in 
international comparisons.  The  linkage between quality and  outcome  is neit 
well defined nor  easily measurable.  Aggregate  mortality and  morbidity 
measures  are generally too gross to permit the accurate measurement  of 
quality.  Death rates,  indices of morbidity,  or more  subtle forms  of 
diminution  in quality of life resulting from  inadequate or poorly enforced 
licensing and/or life-safety standards in hospitals and  nursing homes  or fr 
inadequately trained medical  or para-medical professionals are equally 
important dimensions  of health system performance. 
Virtually all EC  countries are faced  with an  aggregate surplus of physiciar 
and  acute care hospital beds.  In coping with overall surpluses of physicic 
most·EC  countries are now  limiting medical  school enrolments,  and  some  are 
-~aking steps to encourage  physicians to locate in underserved areas. 
The  criteria for evaluating and 4isseminating new  technologies are also a 
critical--determinant of cost, quality and  access.  Some  countries have 
-centralised planning,  while others ·rely on  local planning.  Various  formul. 
and  procedures are  used  to allocate capital,  and  the financing and 
-. reimbursement  ~f ~apital costs differ widely,  from  systems where  all capit. 
is allocated and  financed centrally to those where  authorisation is local  < 
·financing/reimbursement  is ..Pt:edominantly  private.  · 
Legal  practices can  also have  important effects on  the delivery system.  T 
extent of malpractice .litigation can have  substantial effects on  health co 
not only through the litigation itself but through "defensive medicine"  as 
physicians and  hospitals perform extra diagnostic procedures.  Anti-trust, 
medical  practice and  insurance  laws  affect the organisation,  power  and  rol 
of the relevant economic  entities <i.e.  government,  consumers,  medical  car 
providers,  insurers,  employers,  trade unions,  etc.l, determine  the permiss 
delivery arrangements,  affect who  can practice medicine,  and  prescribe the 
interrelationships between  public systems and  private health insurance.  F 
example,  the ability of physicians to organise and  negotiate;  whether 
non-physicians can  practice medicine  as free-standing practitioners;  the 
extent of malpractice suits,· and  the ability of private insurance companie 
sell complementary  policies that fill in the cost-sharing and  physician "e 
charges'' can all have  significant effects on  a  health system's performance 
Thus,  differences  in specific features of health systems  can  have  importar 
effects on  u~ili=ation, prices,  efficiency,  outcomes  and  quality. 
-Unfortunately,  isolating the behavioural  impacts of specific systems'  feat 
on  health systems'  performance  is quite difficult. I 
I 
I 
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PER  CAPITA  HEALTH  SPEIDIIG  AID  GOP,  1971  AID  1984 
(US$  at  GOP  PPPs,  current  prices) 
1971  1984  Co1pound  Annual  Rate 
of  Growth  1971-1984 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I  Country  total Health  GDP  total a·eal th  GDP  I  total Health  GDP 
I  per  capita  per  capita  I  per  eapita  per  capita  I  per  capita  per  capi 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belsiu•  147  3 652  777  12  439  12.6  9.1 
Den1ark  252  4 147  841  13  311  9.1  8.7 
France  223  3 685  1 145  12  642  12.4  9.2 
Ger•any  221  3 993  1 179  13  265  12.1  9.1 
Greece  71  1 756  287  6 311  11.6  9.6 
Ireland  122  2 196  622  7 795  12.3  9.5 
Italy  171  3 193  725  11  193  11.9  8.8 
letherlands  232  3 881  1 111  11  711  11.1  8.2 
Portusal  ·I  275  5 121 
·I 
Spain  112  2 473  -I  476  8 279  11.6  9.1 
·I 
United  linsdo•  161  '3  '563  "I  658  11  168  11.6  8.4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
~i  :  lll&ario&-lealtb  c1re  1961-1983,  OECD,  Paris  1985 
Health  expenditure  for  1984  is an  estiaate  based  on  the  saae  souree  docuaents  and  aethodo: 
used  in  lliiYrinc Htilth  Care  1961-191~· 
Purchasins  power  parities and  population  statistics are  froa  lltiogal Aeeount&.  lain_l&&t! 
lllllt_l,  OECD,  Paris,  1986.  . 
Institutional Expenditure 
Institutional expenditure is the largest and  fastest srowins component  of 
health spending.  Hospital expenditure is by  far the largest component  of 
institutional spending,  which  also includes expenditure on  hospital-based 
physicians,  nursing homes,  and  other institutional health facilities.  In the 
early 1988's,  institutional expenditure accounted  for over half of all health 
spending  in EC  countries. 
With  respect to individual countries,  public institutional expenditure  in the 
early 1980s  is the  largest component  in almost  every country,  varying from 
21.0t in Belgium  <where  the data include only basic room  and  board outlays>  t 
73.9~ in Denmark. ,' 
- 11  -
COMPOSITION  OF  PUBLIC  HEALTH  SPENDING,  1970  AND  1980s 
I 
. I 
I  Country 
I 
.  ··.1 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
I  Country 
-1.  Belgium 
1- Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
· ·t  Portuga  1 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Institutional  Ambulatory 
1970  1980s  1970-80s  I  1970  1980s 
17.2 
64.7 
45.9 
41 .6 
40.1 
51.7 
56.1 
46.6 
56.3 
21.0  (83) 
73.9  (84) 
59.5  (84) 
43.0  (83) 
49.5  (82> 
73.4  (83) 
55.3  (84) 
32.5  ( 82) 
69.3  (84) 
46.3  (83) 
42.5  (81) 
59.7  (79) 
Pharmaceutical 
2.0 
1.0 
2.1 
0.3 
2.0 
0.5 
1.7 
0.7 
39.2 
26.3 
26.3 
32.2 
17.3 
32.2 
5.0 
26.5 
37.7  (81) 
22.0  (84) 
22.9  (81) 
25.5  (83) 
13.4  (82) 
11.5  (82) 
27.8  (83) 
21.5  (82) 
22.2  (81) 
20.7  (83) 
16. 8  (  72)  16. 7  ( 80) 
13.8  11.2  (82> 
Other 
1970  1980s  1970-80s  I  1970  1980s 
18.·9 
·1..6 
. -
. -11.8  ( 81 ) 
4~8 (83) 
20.8  13.1  (84) 
18.2  19.2  (83) 
19.  1  1  4.  8  ( 82) 
2.7  (72)  7.0  (82) 
16.0  13.0  (84) 
6.6  7.2  (84) 
15.6  20.3  (83) 
~6.8 (72)  15.8  (83) 
9.9  10.3  (82) 
-3  .. 4 
-0.3 
-2.6 
0.4 
-1.9 
15.9 
-1.3 
0.6 
2.3 
-5.2 
0.3 
I  24.7 
~ -
8.0 
23.5 
0.1 
32.3 
11.3 
20.0 
29.5  (81) 
7.9  (81) 
12.3  (83) 
22.3  (82> 
9.7  (82> 
4.6  (83) 
3.7  (81) 
12.7  (83) 
25.7  (80) 
20.0  (79) 
.Source:  Measuring Health Care  1960-1983,  OECD,  Paris,  1985. 
1971 
197 
Figures for 1984  are estimates based on  same  sources and  methodolog) 
Many  countries include nursing homes  or long-term custodial care  facilitie~ 
their.hospital classification,  while others have  a  separate classification. 
Other countries  <e.g.  the United Kingdom>  provide extensive amounts  of 
long-term care either in special  long-term care hospitals or in separate  we 
of acute care hospitals. 
.  ' . - 12  -
Differences  in  expenditure per admission mask  enormous  differences  1n  average 
lengths of stay per admission.  While  some  of these differences can  be 
explained  by  lack of comparability of hospital service definitions, 
substantial differences  in average  length of stay persist after adjustment  for 
casemix.  It would  appear that a  significant proportion of these differences 
in costs are due  to differences in intensity of services per case,  efficiency, 
and  possibly outcomes.  However,  certain studies have  shown  that  large 
differences  in  length of stay within given countries are not  necessarily 
related to differences  in health outcomes.  This raises the question of 
whether substantial savings could  be  achieved  by  reducing  lengths of stay. 
The  large documented  differences  in medical  practice,  inappropriate use  of 
certain procedures  <e.g.  cesearean versus normal  deliveries,  complete  versus 
partial mastectomies,  cardiac-by-pass surgery versus drug  therapy>,  as well  as 
documented  savings from  alternative reimbursement  and  delivery arrangements 
would  suggest that significant savings could be  achieved. 
INPATIENT  MEDICAL  CARE  BEDS  PER  1  000  POPULATION,  1960,  1970,  1980s 
I  Country  , 960  1970  1980s 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium  6.0  8.3  9.5  <82) 
Denmark  8. 1  (  61 )  8.3  9.5  (82) 
France  9.6  (62)  10.4  <72>  1  1 . 6  <83> 
Germany  10.5  1  1 . 3  11 . ,  (82> 
Greece  5.8  6.2  6.2  (81 ) 
Ireland  12.6  9.7  (80) 
Italy  7.5  8.8  7.7  (83) 
Luxembourg  1, . 9  12.6  13.0  (83) 
Netherlands  , , . 0  11 . 4  12.0  (83) 
Portugal  5.3  6.0  5. 1  <82) 
Spain  4.3  (62)  4.7  5.4  (  81 ) 
United  Kingdom  10.3  (  61 )  9.4  8. 1  (81) 
---------~----~-------------------------------------------------------------
~:  Data  for  Ireland  in this table include  long-term hospitals. 
Source:  Measuring  Health Care  1960-1983,  OECD,  Paris,  1985. 
The  low  per diem  and  bed  expenditure in the United  Kingdom  is in part due  to 
significant amounts  of  long-term care being provided  in hospitals instead of 
in nursing homes.  Similarly,  if outpatient hospital services were  excluded, 
the cost per capita,  per bed,  per day,  and  per admission  figures  in a  number 
of countries would  be  reduced.  Differences  in staffing and  the ages  and 
amounts  of equipment  and  physical plant will also have  significant effects on 
expenditure differences. - 13  -
HOSPITAL  OCCUPANCY  RATES  1960,  1970,  1980s 
Country  1960  1970  1980s 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium  68.5  (65)  75.6  81 .6  ( 81) 
Denmark  88.2  (  61 )  87.7  78.6  (82) 
France  91.2  (62)  88.2  73.2  <83) 
Germany  94.0  87.7  84.1  (82) 
Greece  61.4  70.7  71 . 2 (  81 ) 
Ireland  80.1  (82) 
Italy  80.6  81 . 1  78.1  (83) 
Luxembourg  78.4  78.1  78.4  (83) 
Netherlands  92.3  (68)  91.5  91.5  <83) 
Portugal  74.5  <82) 
Spain  76.4  66.0  ( 81) 
United Kingdom  90.1  84.1  81.4  ( 81) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
~:  Hospital occupancy rate = <Days  per capita x  population> 
<  365  x  hospital beds  > 
The  above  table contains occupancy  rates for 1960,  1970  and  the early 1980s. 
Occupancy  rates have  been  falling slightly over the entire period with the 
largest declines taking place  in the past 10  years, - 14  -
HOSPITAL  ADMISSION  RATES  1960,  1970,  1980s 
<Percent  of population 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I  Country  1960  1970  1980s 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium  8.0  (65)  9.3  13.9  ( 81) 
Denmark  12.7  (63)  14.4  19.2  (83) 
France  6.7  (66)  7.4  1  1.  8  (83) 
Germany  12.5  14.6  , 8.1  (82> 
Greece  7.0  ( 61)  10.6  11 •  9  (82> 
Ireland  16.4  (82) 
Italy  7.8  13.8  , 5.4  (83) 
Luxembourg  1  1 . 6  13.4  18.1  (83) 
I  Netherlands  8.6  (63)  10.0  11 •  8  (83) 
Portugal  4.2  5.9  9.6  <82) 
Spain  7.1  (72>  9.2  ( 81) 
United Kingdom  9.2  ( 61 )  11 . 3  12.7  (81.) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SQJ.Ir~~=  M~SiiJ.u:ins  H~Sil:tb  ~SIX:~  126~-BJ,  OECD,  Paris,  1985. 
AVERAGE  LENGTH  OF  STAY,  1960,  1970,  1980s 
I  Country  1960  1970  1980s 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Belgium  14.4  (65)  15.6  13.5  ( 81) 
Denmark  22.2  (63)  18.1  11.9  (82) 
France  22.8  (61)  18.3  14.1  (83) 
Germany  28.7  24.9  18.7  <82> 
Greece  , 8. 8  (61)  15.0  13.0  (82) 
Ireland  13.3  9.0  (82) 
Italy  27.9  18.8  12.0  (83) 
Luxembourg  29.0  27.0  21.0  <83) 
Netherlands  39.4  (68)  38.2  34.1  (83) 
Portugal  19.5  18.4  14.4  (81) 
Spain  18.0  (72>  14.6  (81) 
United  Kingdom  35.9  25.7  18.6  (81) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
~Ql.!r~~:  M~a:zurins H~sltb ~st~  19~~-aJ.  OECD,  Paris,  1985. H
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Ambulatory  Care 
Ambulatory  care  is the  second  largest component  of  <public>  health spending  in 
most  EC  countries and  is a  critical determinant  of overall health spending, 
because  of the physician's central decision-maker/gatekeeper role,  the 
cost-effectiveness of preventive services,  and  the potential substitutability 
of costly institutional for  less costly ambulatory  care services. 
The  prices of ambulatory  care services for all countries increased at the 
second  highest rate  <after institutional prices>,  and  slightly exceeded 
overall  inflation.  With  respect to individual countries in 1970  such  spending 
ranged  from  5.0  ~n the Netherlands  to 39.2  in Belgium. 
These  observed  differences in ambulatory  care expenditure are due  to 
differences in definitions,  differences  in delivery system characteristics, 
and  differences  in the provision and  use of physician services.  For  example, 
the national source statistics underlying these data often do  not  permit  the 
inclusion of outpatient hospital services  in the ambulatory  care 
classification.  Moreover,  there is no  consistent international data source on 
total physician expenditure,  or such  spending disaggregated by  place of 
service.  However,  data are available on  the numbers  of physicians,  use  of 
outpatient physician services,  fees  for certain medical  procedures,  and 
physicians'  incomes. 
The  table contains data on  the number  of physicians per 1000  population  in 
1960,  1970,  and  the early 1980s.  There  has been  substantial growth  in the 
physician-population ratios in all EC  countries and  Portugal experienced the 
largest srowth,  while  Ireland had  the  lowest. 
PHYSICIANS  PER  <1000>  CAPITA,  1960,  1970,  1980s 
Physicians per 1000  population 
1960  1970  1980s 
Belgium  1 . 2  1. 6  2.6  (  81 ) 
Denmark  1. 3  (62>  1. 5  2.it  <82> 
France  1 . 0  1.3  2.2  <83) 
Germany  1 . 4  1. 6  2.4  (82) 
Greece  1 . 3  1. 6  2.5  (  81 ) 
Ireland  1.  0  (  61 )  1 . 2  (  71 )  1 . 2  <75) 
Italy  0.5  0.7  , . 3  (83) 
Luxembourg  , •  0  , . 1  1 . 7  (83) 
Netherlands  1 . 1  1. 2  2.1  (83) 
Portugal  0.8  0.9  2. 1  (  81 ) 
Spain  1 . 2  1 . 3  2.6  (  81 ) 
United  Kingdom  1. 0  (  71 )  1. 3  ( 8, ) 
SQyrc~:  Measuring  Health Care  1960-1983,  OECD,  Paris,  1985. M
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Much  of this growth  took  place as a  result of deliberate government  pol1c1es 
to increase the number  of physicians from  levels that were  perceived as 
inadequate  in the 1950s  and  1960s.  But  in the context of the 1970s  and  1980s 
the expansion  of medical  school capacities as well as the high rates of retu 
to individuals from  medical  education have  resulted in overall surpluses of 
physicians and  restrictions on  medical  school  enrolments  in most  EC  countrie 
although there continue to be·shortages of physicians in certain specialitie 
and  geographic areas. 
In addition to these factors,  there are important  consequences  for health 
systems'  performance  from  the number,  growth  and  mix  of specialists.  The 
extent to which  specialists,  as opposed  to generalists,  provide care,  the 
types of care they provide,  the education and  credentialling processes for 
specialists,  and  referral patterns among  generalists and  specialists all hav 
important  consequences  for access,  cost,  quality and  outcomes.  The  importanc 
of these factors must  be  considered  in interpreting the results below. 
OUTPATIENT  PHYSICIAN  CONSULTATIONS,  1970,  1980s 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Country 
United  Kingdom 
1970 
3.2 
5  ... 2 
6.3 
1 .5 
2.6 
Source:  Measuring  Health Care  1960-1983,  OECD,  Paris. 
1980s 
7.1  (81) 
8.4  <82) 
4.7  <83) 
5.3  <82) 
6.0  <82) 
8.3  (81) 
3.2  (80) 
3.8  (82) 
4.7  (80) 
4.2  (83) 
There  are no  internationally comparable detailed measures of the absolute  01 
_ relative price levels of physician services for the EC  countries,  although · 
EC  is currently in the process of collecting such  information in their 
updating of price levels of certain medical  services which  are collected fo: 
number  of European  countries by  the Association Internationale de la Mutual: 
<AIM>,  a  Geneva-based  organisation of European  mutual  insurance organisatio1 
The  table contains the  fees  in local currencies and  PPP-adjusted  US  dollars 
for 18  medical,  surgical,  laboratory,  radiology,  and  dental procedures for 
Belgium,  Germany,  France,  Luxembourg,  the Netherlands and  Denmark.  These 
figures must  be  interpreted with caution,  since procedures may  not be  defin· 
exactly the same  across countries and  fees may  vary by  speciality of the 
physician or place of service  <e.g.  lab or physician's office>.  Where  fees 
vary within a  country,  the maximum  fee  levels are chosen  for  inclusion in tl 
table. - 20  -
MEDICAL  SERVICE  FEES,  1984 
<In  local currency  and  US$  at PPPs> 
I  Nether- Belgium  Germany  France  1 Luxem- Denmark 
1 bourg  lands 
Bf  I  gtJ  I  [[  I  I[L  I  [l  I  K.  s 
I 
1 •  GP  home  visit  430  12  29  14  81  18  I  680  18  89  , 1 
I 
2.  First consulta- I 
tion of  internal  I 
medicine  with  I 
major  examina- I 
tion  659  18  21  10  95  15  I 1135  31  52  22  337  41 
I 
3.  Normal  delivery 
by  GP  5084  139  97  45  950  154  4055  109  604  258  446  54 
4.  Cholecystectomy  8317  227  293  136  920  149  7385  199  328  140 
5.  Total 
hysterectomy  8911  243  325  151  1, 50  187  8025  216  423  181 
6.  Appendectomy  4752  130  174  81  575  93  3805  103  188  80 
7.  Examination  of 
urine  83  2  119  19  1  1  1  3  22  3 
8.  Prothrombin  time 
test  131  4  26  4  1  1  1  2  44  5 
9.  Total cholesterol 
dosage  136  4  17  3  134  4  68  8 
10.  Thorax  radiography: 
1.  incidence  664  18  53  25  122  20  I  595  16  22  9  411  50 
1  1 •  Colon  radiography  3318  91  95  44  446  72  1355  37  58  25  454  55 
12.  Radiography  of 
lombascral  column  1611  44  90  42  180  29  360  10  31  13  363  44 
13.  Electro-
encephalogram  2043  56  69  32  805  131  1055  28  86  37  219  26 
14.  Electrocardiogram  530  14  30  14  92  15  525  14  88  1  1 
15.  Bronchoscopy  1792  49  70  49  345  56  2425  65  153  65  398  48 
16.  Rectosigmoidoscopy  754  21  106  49  115  19  850  23  1  17  50  398  48 
17.  Extraction of one 
lower  molar  298  8  16  7  92  15  295  8  1  1  5  104  13 
18.  Filling:  one  face  529  14  26  12  74  12  495  13  19  8 - 21  -
Notes:  Data  generally refer to 1984;  however  the data for the Netherlands, 
depending  on  the procedure,  refer to 1981,  1982,  1983  or 1984. 
Yhere  a  choice  among  plans or a  range  of  fees  is presented,  the maximum 
fee  is chosen  <e.g.  the electroencephalogram  fee  for France>. 
Additional mileage  charges for  <GP>  home  visits are paid  in Luxembourg 
and  Denmark. 
Fees  may  refer to different specialities;  procedures may  not  be  exactly 
comparable;  and  there may  be  some  non-comparability  in terms of technical 
<e.g.  lab>  and  professional/physician interpretation>  components  of 
various procedures. 
Sources:  Financing and  Delivering Health Care:  A Comparative  Analysis of  OECD 
Countries,  OECD,  Paris,  1987. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
United  Kingdom 
PHYSICIAN  INCOMES,  1970,  1981 
Relative to average 
employee  income 
1970  1981 
1 • 8 
2.8  (80) 
4.8  3.3  (79) 
6.4  (  71 )  4.9  (80) 
1. 5  1 . 2 
1 .  Le  1 • 1 
2.4 
Absolute  amount 
<US$  GOP  PPPs> 
1970  1981 
35  500 
38  400 
26  600  46  800 
40  800  ( 71)  76  300 
14  200  18  200 
8  600  19  600 
32  30"0 
Sources:  Measuring  Health Care  1960-1983,  OECD,  Paris,  1985. 
Pharmaceuticals 
(80) 
(79) 
(80) 
Pharmaceutical  expenditure is the third largest component  of public health 
expenditure.  Pharmaceutical prices increased at a  12.6~ annual rate,  the 
slowest  growing  health care price component. 
The  table displays per capita pharmaceutical  expenditure and  consumption  for 
the  EC  countries for 1970  and  the 1980s.  These  data must  be  interpreted with 
caution,  since pharmaceuticals consumed  in hospitals are generally reported as 
hospital expenditure,  and  outpatient pharmaceutical expenditure and 
consumption  may  be  understated.  In the early 1980s  per capita expenditure 
varied  from  $42  in Denmark  to S194  in Germany.  Pharmaceuticcal  consumption, 
prescriptions per person  <measured  in numbers  of prescriptions not dosage 
units>,  has  increased.  The  countries with the highest consumption  in terms of 
numbers  of prescriptions are France  and  Italy.  However,  there does  not  appear 
to be  a  strong relationship between  expenditure per capita and  prescriptions 
per capita.  This result suggests that  internal pricing policies vary widely. 
Furthermore,  as far as consumption  of pharmaceuticals is concerned,  although 
it would  be  expected  that  the more  physicians and  pharmacists per capita,  the 
greater the use  of pharmaceuticals,  the data  indicate no  significant 
relationships between  expenditure/consumption and  physicians/pharmacists per 
capita. - 22  -
PHARMACEUTICAL  EXPENDITURE  PER  CAPITA  AND  CONSUMPTION,  1970,  1980s 
1970  1980s 
Expenditure  Number  of  Expenditure  Number  of 
per capita  prescriptions  per capita  prescriptions 
<USS.  GDP  PPPs>  per capita  <USS.  GOP  PPPs>  per capita 
lelsium  53.7  127.8  (82)  9.9  (82) 
Denmark  12.9  42.4  (83)  6.3  (83> 
Fr.nce  56.5  17.4  188.1  (84>  28.9  (  81 ) 
;ermany  46.2  194.1  (82> 
;reece  29.9  5.8  73.7  (82)  7.4  <82) 
Ireland  27.1  67.4  (81)  1, . 9  (  81 ) 
It~ly  26.5  10.9  11 e  .1  (83)  21.5  (77) 
LUXHbourl  45.7  11.3  138.5  (84)  12.4  (78) 
Netherl.nds  17.5  9.1  1&4.3  (84) 
Portuaal  14.8  61.7  (81)  1  5. 5  (  81 ) 
Spain  9.2  75.7  (80)  1  1 . 9  (83) 
United  Kinadom  5.5  6.8  (82) 
Sources:  Measurins Health Care  1960-83,  OECD,  1985. 
Fisures for 1984  are preliminary OECD  Secretariat estimates. 
Other Health Expenditure 
This cate1ory covers all other medical  services includina therapeutic 
appliances,  biomedical research,  etc.  Since it is calculated as a  residual 
<e.g.  institutional,  ambulatory and  pharmaceutical expenditure are subtracted 
from  the total>,  it could also be  picking up  expenditure associated with 
classification errors or differences in service definitions. 
HEALTH  EXPENDITURE  BY  AGE  AND  GROWTH  IN  SPENDING 
BY  2010  AND  2830 
Ratio of per capita  I  I 
Country  health spending on  I  1988-2010  I  2010-2030  11980-2030 
those age  65  and  overiTotal  Per  I Total  Per  !Total  Per 
to those under  65  I  Capital  Capital  Capita 
Bel1ium  1 . 7  -1  1  -1  3  -1  4 
Denmark  4.1  -4  5  0  20  -4  17 
France  2.4  1  1  3  5  6  I  16  9 
Germ.ny  2.6  -3  6  -a  7  1-10  13 
Ireland  4.5  22  1  16  9  I  41  10 
Italy  2.2  1  4  -4  5  I  -3  9 
Netherlands  4.5  17  9  13  18  32  29 
United  Kiflldom  1..3  2  e  12  10  15  10 
~:  a>  Ratio of total health spending of those aaed  65  and  over to those 
below  aae 65.  For  other countries the ratio reflects public spending 
only. 
b>  Calculations are based  on  the assumption  that the ratios of per 
capita total health spending of those a1ed  65  and  over to those 
below  65  in 1980  are the same  as the ratios presented here. - 23  -
Sources:  The  Social Policy  Implications of  Ageing  Populations,  OECD,  Paris. 
Data  for  Italy are from  G.  Lojacono,  Study  on  the Evaluation of 
Cost/Effectiveness of Alternative Strategies for  the Health Care  of 
the Elderly,  World  Health Organisation. 
The  burden of health expenditure falls mainly  on  the working  population.  As 
such,  the ability of countries to finance  these  increased expenditure 
resulting from  population ageing  <as  well  as those  emanating  from  general 
population growth>  will depend  on  changes  in the relative size of the 
productive population as reflected  in dependency  ratios,  as well as  labour 
force participation rates,  unemployment  rates and  productivity.  As  would  be 
expected,  those countries facing potentially large  increases in per capita 
expenditure also  face  large  increases  in their aged  dependency  ratios and,  to 
a  lesser extent,  in their total dependency  ratios.  All  EC  countries except 
Ireland and  Portugal  face  increases  in their total dependency  ratios,  with 
Luxembourg  facing the  largest  increase. 
Over  the past several years many  countries have  restrained prices for health 
services,  affecting particularly hospitals,  physicians,  and  pharmaceuticals. 
Many  of the measures  taken have  been  based  solely on  budgetary grounds  and 
have  not  been  targeted to overall reform of reimbursement  systems.  Such 
measures  include freezing or indexation of hospital reimbursements,  physiciar 
fee  schedules,  and  pharmaceutical reimbursements.  In the process there has 
been  relatively little evaluation of the  impacts  of such policies on  quality, 
access,  outcomes  or  increased service provision that can offset potential 
savings from  price controls.  However,  in a  number  of countries either major 
reforms or basic elements of reform have  been  the principal elements of pricE 
restraint policies.  The  prospectively-set global budget  in France  is an 
example  of price restraint policy embodying  incentive reforms.  Limitations or 
hospital reimbursements  in Belgium  have  been  accompanied  by  strong incentive! 
to convert excess hospital beds  into nursing home  beds.  On  the other hand, 
most  physician price restraints embody  simply  the freezing of fees,  with no 
basic  incentive reforms.  However,  several countries such as the Netherlands 
and  France have  been  attempting to adjust relative fee  levels to promote 
incentives  in the provision of physician services.  Unfortunately,  there is 
little empirical  evidence  of the effects of such  changes on  the use of 
specific physician and  other health services or on  the effects on  overall 
spending and  health. 
Other countries have  focused  their efforts on  high volume  pharmaceuticals an, 
the use of  lower  cost generic equivalents.  Competitive bidding and  bulk 
purchasing,  as  in the United  Kingdom  for  laundry and  food  services for 
hospitals are also examples  of  the use  of reimbursement  mechanisms  to  induce 
efficiency and  reduce  costs. 
Policies to reduce utilisation can  focus  on  consumers  through cost-sharing, 
providers through  alternative delivery arrangements  and  health planning and 
delivery system controls,  and  both consumers  and  providers through 
administrative reviews.  Cost-sharing is currently employed  as a  financing 
and/or resource allocation mechanism  in most  EC  countries. 
There  appears to be  a  strong feeling  in several European  countries that the 
introduction of cost-sharing results in an  initial drop  in utilisation, 
followed  by  a  return to the original consumption  trends.  Effects on 
expenditure and  on  health have  been  analysed.  With  respect to expenditure, 
those  individuals facing cost-sharing used  fewer  outpatient and  hospital 
services.  In both cases,  the cost per treatment between  those  with and  thosE .  ' 
- 24  -
without  cost-sharing was  similar,  the basic reductions occurring in the numb 
of episodes of care.  Cost-sharing compared  with free care substantially 
reduced  the use  of hospital emergency  departments for less serious ailments. 
With  respect to health status,  of ten health measures  initially analysed  for 
adults,  free care was  associated only with  improvements  in corrected vision 
and  high blood  pressure,  and  did not affect the health of the average person 
In other words,  cost-sharing_in most  cases did not negatively affect outcome 
In practice virtually all EC  countries require some  cost-sharing,  at least 1 
prescription drugs.  Nevertheless,  in most  European  countries cost-sharing i5 
quite nominal. 
Even  in countries such as France where  copayment  and/or coinsurance rates 
appear substantial  <e.g.  20-25~>.  low  limits on  total out-of-pocket costs ar 
exclusions for many  categories of cases or individuals result in relatively 
small out-of-pocket costs and,  probably,  limited behavioural  impacts. 
Alternative delivery arrangements,  such as Health  Maint~nance Organisations 
<HMOs>  and  Preferred Provider Organisations  <PPOs>,  can  reduce utilisation t 
making  medical  care providers financially responsible for their decisions ar 
by  limiting consumer  choice of provider to those willing to abide by  the ru] 
of the organisation.  Such  arrangements rely on  market  incentives rather thar 
insurers'  controls or sovernment  regulations. 
A plethora of new  delivery arrangements bas the potential to reduce 
expenditure through the more  efficient provision of services.  Among  these nE 
arrangements are:  diagnostic imaging-centres,  pain clinics, ~reestanding 
·-cancer  centres,. birth centres, ·hospices,  home  health -care, :f.itness programu 
rehabilitation centres,  ambulatory care centres,  physician:sroup practices, 
HHOs.,  PPOs,  freestanding ambulatory. and sursery .centres, ·alcohol  and  drug 
abuse  centres,  mental  health facilities,  nursing homes,  and  independen~. 
·clinical laboratories.  Expenditure can be  reduced  through  incentives for 
-efficient provision ·<HMOs>,  reduced-reimbursements for volune suarantees 
<PPOs>,  'through the· ·substitution of  less~  medically intensive levels of 
institutional care  <nursing  homes  for hospitals>,  outpatient for inpatient 
· care  <freestanding clinics of various types,  home  health care>  or through 
preventive medicine.  ..  -· 
The  -savings  potentia  "I ·of  many· -of  ~hese new .delivery -arrangements  depend  on 
whether they are substitutes or-add-ons to existing services, -and  on  method~ 
·of  reimbursement  and coverage 't'Ules.  HMOs  and ambulatory sursery centres ha· 
been  shown  to lead to significant reductions in hospital expenditure.  There 
has been  considerable ·interest in HMOs  because  for a tixed expenditure per 
year per enrollee,  the HMO  is responsible for all care.  Hence,  HMOs  have 
incentives-not only to limit spending but to keep  enrollees healthy.  Resear· 
on  HMOs  has  shown  that the main  reason they are  18-48~ cheaper than 
fee-for-service medicine,  is that hospitalisation costs,  larsely because  of 
fewer  admissions,  are reduced.  Questions have ·also been raised in terms  of 
· whether  HMOs  enroll healthier individuals and  the technical capacity of 
governments  to establish capitation rates for ·hish-risk groups. 
·Virtually all EC  countries are restricting medical  school. enrolments,  and  i· 
some  countries new  physicians are able to receive insurance billing numbers 
-.··  -only  for underserved areas. ·countries are trying ·to reduce  excess hospital 
'beds·in a  variety of-ways,  including conversion to long-term care beds  and 
some  cases <e.g.  Belgium,  Germany,  the Netherlands>  by  limiting costly 
intensive-care beds.  Several countries are developing more  effective planni 
systems  and  technology  assessment  is receiving increased attention.  Countri - 25  -
are putting more  effort into prevention,  lifestyles,  and  measuring  outcomes. 
Increased attention is also being devoted  to utilisation review,  both from 
cost and  quality perspectives.  Tougher  reimbursement  sy.stems  require 
monitoring to prevent  fraud  and  abuse.  Nevertheless,  in many  EC  countries 
formal  quality assurance systems  are weak  or non-existent.  Truly  effective 
cost-containment can  be  achieved  only if quality of care and  health  outcome~ 
do  not suffer. 
Narrowing  programme  boundaries through changes  in eligibility standards or 
benefits covered  can  also reduce  expenditure.  Affluent groups  can  be  droppe' 
from  coverage  and  marginal benefits eliminated or reduced.  In certain 
countries,  more  affluent groups  are given the option to buy  public or priva 
coverage  with little or no  public subsidy.  Other countries have  reduced 
benefits in areas perceived as marginal  <spa  treatments,  certain 
pharmaceuticals>  and/or have  provided  incentives for the use  of cost-effect 
preventive services and  healthy lifestyles.  These  activities are taking pla 
through social insurance systems,  public health programmes,  and  direct 
regulation of  individual behaviour  <e.g.  seat belt laws,  smoking  restrictio 
in public buildings,  etc.>.  Freedom  of choice of medical  care providers can 
also be  reduced  to encourage  use  of  lower  cost providers. 
There  have  however  been  few,  if any,  major  changes  in hospital or physiciar. 
service benefits.  Marginal  new  benefits such  as hospice care have  been  adde 
in some  countries and  new  therapies such as liver and  heart  tr~splants hav 
.: .been -covered  for certain population groups.  While  there do  not appear to be 
. · · ·substantial changes  in benefits covered,  countries are .increasingly adding 
·- 4economic  efficiency criteria to the "medically-.necessary" criteria that are 
.- .._enerally ·employed  to ,establish coverage  of new  procedures.  Increased 
· ~,  .,attention is also  .. being devoted  to denying coverage for medical  procedures 
~.that are·no longer deemed  to.be.medically_ effective. 
··Limiting freedom  of choice.of. physicians or.  hospitals is prevalent.  Severa] 
··.:countries  <e.g.  the United ·Kingdom,  Denmark,  Spain,  Ireland>  currently lim: 
choice of either generalist or specialist physicians.  Limitations of freedc 
of choice  in terms of using physicians as gatekeepers and/or  limiting covet 
to only lower  cost providers are features that  ~re. inherent  in efficient 
alternative delivery systems such as HMOs.  -
:·::Health .care -expendi-ture  can :be  -reduc~d :or revenues enhanced  through a varif 
of tinancing changes.  ~verall·budget controls.can be  put into .place by 
- . establishing a  closed-ended annual appropriation.  Such  appropriations can 1 
: - established to limit  ~otal health spending,  national government  spending  Ol 
- ~  spending 'for particular types of services. The _issues here are the allocat: 
-:~·of the total in a  way·that·promotes  efficient~esource use  and  the potentii 
_:for eost-shifting. If costs are shifted to local governments  or consumers, 
total medical  costs or indeed total governmental  costs may  not  be  controll· 
Similarly,  expenditure can.be·closed-ended through health care voucher 
approaches,  whereby  individuals would  be  given a  voucher  of fixed value to 
- -purchase·. private health ·insurance.  By ·purchasing from  the most  efficient 
entit.y or delivery system,  the. consumer  gets more  services and  the 
government's financial  liability is limited to the voucher  amount.  The  key 
- ~3·  ·issues wi1:h  vouchers, ·like :HHOs,  are establishing the capitation amounts, 
-~-~ -series~f problems  of adverse selection· if the government  remains  the  insu 
· - ~  -of ·last resort.  the necessary regulation of the -·private ·sector,  and  the 
:potential for cost-shifts to.beneficiaries and  local governments . 
....  ....  ..  '  .. 
..:  -~ ~ . '-0tl-rer f inanci ng approaches i:h,:.rt t "',r.)i'! -' :1 l'e\.,'r.:fit-:€5 rrlc Iude ralSrnF px rqr tng ol'
introcJucing neb, taxes, raisinB ia it-':r".:Ct;crng  premiumS, ar:d ei:nin;rti;ig tJX
SUbSidieS iOf the Pllfehage nf i'-,.'''='  i " '  ,'-''1 -.r' '-J:''t:] se-viCAS.
Conclu5lons
over the last decade budget pressures in p;,rticular have led governments  to
become increasingly  eoncerned ur ih ,rt I're f cr rnoney. Huch of the policy
emphesis has Efriited from acees': to ri;ir':?nc'.t. fhere is increasir€ evidence
that the signifieant differences brth i.;ithi.n and aeross countries in sPendint
and utj.IiEation and intensity,)f -i?r^"'..:el lcrllFrct be fully justified on the
basis r:f qtrality and health out:.ines. There 1s a growing body of evidence that
indicates a uidlspnead inapp:.epriat1 uie cf hcspitals and certain surtical and
other diagnostic services.
Substantial savings eould also be ach:.eved through reimbursenent reforos.
Current reforms anO fr:tur* pol.r,:y -hrieeE both involve governments, either
direetly as the prinr-.ipal supp:ii'i .'; ,a?-,:-rlces and finance, oF indirectly in
terms oi its regulatory po'rer. i'n:r* 3:'e s ni.:mber of reasons for this
influential no1e, r,rhich is likeiy to,;r.iJ1!inue. In the first  Place, the nigh1Y
publicised successes of meder;: rneCi':i.ne ovet' the Past 40 years have
conditionec the public to expect a tecl:nical solution to each and every
perceiver1 health care probiem. Oven a ir€7".r'ruide range of ilLnesses, this
expeetation ha.s been uarranted. lirgh enci j.nr:reasint success rates have
encouraged patients to aeceFt nothi.ng Iess than a suceessful outcome. In those
areas uhere it  is knotun that technicai "cure!" do not yet exist, it  has becoote
difficult  to admit that, given suff i.cien+- rime and resources, one cannot be
found. Such an attitude has not been ,j j.scouraged, whether by consumers'
practitioners, researchers or fina.ncir:g authr-rrities.  Nevertheless, in the
context of theEe current exp*cra i ion-;. t':ehno logical develoPments  and changing
population eomposition are forcing go,.'ernments to nake difficult  decisions
concerning the financing of health se'vi':e5 anci the rationint of certain
technologies.
Seconci . p!.essure  f or gover!-rment inul l.r,ement Persists because lhe provision of
health. ea:e is regarded as a social gcod. The financing of health care
serviceE is cr eollective activity ard i.ts provision, in almost all  countries,
iE assured by the State. This arises no i: i.ri'rl! because of the need to provide
insurance against catastrophic risl:. i;u; aiso because the Provision of health
care has become increasingly part of an inter-generational transfer from the
workingtotheretiredpoPulation'.'hosehealthneedsbecometreateraSthey
age.nJOea to this task of providine senereL social insurance is the exPlicit
des ire on the part of al l  EC celintr -: e:; to ensure universal coverage and
equality of aceess.
Third, and in aEsociat ion r,ri th the expanding technolotY, it  is clear that
,  strong economic forees are invoJ.vecl . communities are tenerally rrlilling to
devot e an irrcreas ing proport iurr I : the:.r r ising income to the consumPt ion of
health care services. The publ ic app*ars tr: be tenerally satisf ied tlith their
healih systems and happy to see ti:l ir  coi:tinued expansion. But policy-makers
are ccr:c€rh€d abrrut the extent ic wl'rtch eit-hrr this grouth, otr the
satisfaction r,rith it,  reflecr:E ihe open-ended urey in which health care is
f inarrced, the pressures exerted b',' srrpplying professionals, oF a lack of
eost -consc iousness on the part cf. tl're eonslrrners and providers.
Finaiiy, in those ereas of health care systems uhere private provision and
rrarket incent ives play a s rtn !f icant ro le , tovernoents have not been tli I I ir€
, to leave the outcome to the coirrple.tety f,fee play of narlet forces. For- 27  -
competition  to work  a  certain amount  of government  oversight  is required.  The 
consumer  is,  to a  considerable extent,  protected  from  the consequer.ces  of his 
or her  ignorance,  minimum  quality  assuranc~ is prescribed,  and  reimbursement 
rates for  suppliers approximating  some  concept  of  eff1cent  del1vet·y  dt'«' 
established. 
Together  these  influences add  up  to a  large and  growing  demand  to which 
governments  and  policymakers must  respond.  Many  of the benefits of modern 
medicine  cannot  be  quantified  in terms of money,  life expectancy or other 
social,  medical  or economic  terms.  There  is also a  growing  ethical element  in 
the decisions which  must  be  taken.  Reductions  in pain and  suffering,  in 
premature  deaths and  in deformities,  together with an  increased capacity for 
work,  leisure and  enjoyment  have  all contributed to a  high standard of  living 
and  an  improved  quality of life.  Modern  medicine  has bestowed  tremendous 
benefits on  society.  But  the  exigencies of budgets force  policymakers to 
interpret the value which  society wishes  to place on  these considerable but 
often  intangible benefits,  and  to weigh  their priority relative to other 
community  goals. - 28  -
8  E L G I  U M 
Administrative Structure 
Like  France,  Belgium  does  not  have  one  system  of social  insurance  for health 
care.  The  sickness funds  are  the administrative units which  reimburse  the 
insured  and  the institutions which  provide care.  The  employees  of the Belgian 
railway  and  their dependents  and  seamen  and  their dependents  have  separate 
insurance  arrangements. 
The  administrative structure of the Belgian health care system  is very 
complex.  At  the national  level there are seven ministries  involved  in 
national policy making,  guidance  and  control  in the care field  - Labour, 
Public Works,  Defence,  Agriculture,  Education,  Public Health and  the Family, 
and  Social  Welfare.  Of  these seven ministries,  the Ministry of Social Welfare 
is of primary  importance  with regard to general social  insurance.  Social 
security contributions,  including health care,  are paid to the National  Social  , 
Security Organization,  which  divides the monies  amongst  the various benefit 
programmes.  The  health care revenues are given to the National  Sickness 
Insurance  Institution  <INAMI>  which  divides it amongst  the six groupings  of 
sickness funds. 
There  are  600  local government  areas  <the  smallest unit has  5  000  inhabitants> 
and  these bodies have  an  important  role  in the provision of health care 
<e.g.  public hospitals>. 
Two  types of additional  insurances are offered by  the sickness funds, 
'compulsory-voluntary'  insurance and  voluntary  insurance. 
Compulsory-voluntary  insurance is not  laid down  in statute law  but membership 
of  a  particular sickness fund  obliges the  insured person to contribute towards 
the cost of provision.  Voluntary  insurance is provided by  the  funds  to  'top 
up'  statutory benfits.  The  activities of the private insurance market  are 
small. 
The  effect of the various statutory schemes  is that over  99%  of the population 
have  social  insurance cover.  However  the extent of coverage  varies between 
the various groups.  In particular the self employed  and  their dependents  are 
covered  for heavy  risks only  <hospital  care,  the social diseases  <TB,  cancer, 
etc.>. 
Those  not  covered,  in part or  in whole,  by  the social  insurance schemes  have 
access to the social aid programme  which  is means  tested. 
Contributions by  the  insured 
The  contribution rates for health care social insurance are of two  types:  one 
for  general  scheme  benificiaries  <who  have  full cover>  and  one  for heavy  risk 
ben~ficiaries Ci.e.  the self-employed who  only have  partial cover>.  The 
programme  for the self-employed  is financed  by  a  contribution related  to their 
1ncome. 
Railway  workers  and  seamen  pay  different  levels of contribution. - 29  -
The  contribution rates finance  medical  care only. 
Government  contributions 
The  State meets  95%  of the cost of treating the social diseases  <cancer,  TB, 
poliomyelitis,  mental  illness and  handicap>.  For  ordinary medical  care a 
State subsidy of  27%  of the budget  of the  insurance  institutions is paid to 
INAMI.  The  State pays  contributions to sickness funds  on  behalf of the 
unemployed.  Local  Government  also finances social aid health care benefits. 
Despite this substantial  involvement  in the financing of care,  the State 
exercises little control over expenditure.  The  sickness funds  are autonomous 
and  decentralized. 
The  private  insurance and  the additional  insurance provided by  the sickness 
funds  and  firms  enable the  insured to meet  the costs of care which  are not 
covered  by  social  insurance.  The  extent of social  insurance reimbursement  is 
determined  by  the "ticket moderateur".  Generally patients pay  25%  of the cost 
for primary care.  Old-age  pensioners,  orphans,  widows  and  invalids can get a 
higher  level  of exemption  from  the fees.  A lump  sum  charge  is levied for 
pharmaceutical  products,  with  exemptions  for the pensioner and  the other 
groups  cited above.  Hospitalization is free. 
Benefits 
The  primary health care benefits of the Belgian health care  insurance system 
consists of cash refunds of part,  and,  in some  cases,  the whole  of the cost of 
care,  as set out  in the preceding section.  The  extent of benefits is 
comprehensive  in the general  scheme  and  limited  in the scheme  of the 
self-employed.  There  are no  duration limits on  benefits. 
The  insured person  is free to choose  his doctor provided  the physician is 
qualified to practice  in Belgium  and  registered on  the Medical  Council's list. 
The  doctor's pay  is the result of negotiation between  the profession,  the 
funds  and  the hospitals.  The  community  doctor and  the hospital doctor are 
paid per  item  of service.  The  full  fee  is paid to him  by  the patient who  then 
gets a  refund  from  his fund  at the appropriate rate - generally 75%. 
Specialist care is available out  of hospital on  the same  financial basis 
although  some  service provided by  specialists  <e.g.  X-rays  and  other 
diagnostic tests>  are reimbursed  only if they are carried out  in hospitals. 
Dental  care  is provided  on  the same  basis although false teeth are only 
available on  these terms after the patient has  reached  the age  oi 50. 
The  cost of pharmaceutical  products  is partially reimbursed. 
m~de between  drugs  made  up  in the  pharmacy  and  branded  drugs. 
sick the prices are reduced. 
Distinction is 
For the chronic 
The  cost of hospitalization is met  fully by  the  funds  for  the first  40  days  of 
treatment.  Since  1964  legislation has  been  in force to regulate the daily 
maintenance  charge  which  public and  private hospitals are permitted to charge. 
This charge  covers depreciation,  administration,  hotel costs,  nursing and 
maintenance  staff costs but  excludes  payments  for drugs  and  physicians' 
services.  The  patient can  elect to have  superior  <hotel>  accommodation  but  is 
obliged to meet  the cost  of this out of his own  resources. 
The  cost  of accommodation  has  been  raised to reduce social  insurance costs, 
and  the  charges for superior hotel accommodation  have  been  raised for each day 
of care. - 30  -
The  Cross Organizations  <e.g.  Yellow  and  White-Cross>  are organizat1ons which 
provide social workers,  home  nursing,  preventative care and  propagQnda  t0 
members  who  pay  a  yearly contribution. 
HOSPITAL  BEDS 
I  Number  of hospitals .  Beds  per 1  000  inhabitants  1 
1  January 
of  each year  1------------------------------------------------------------------
public  I  private  I  total  public  I  private  1  total  1 
I 
Acute  general hospitals 
1977  103  194  I  297  I  2.18  I  3.03  5.21 
I  I 
Psychiatric hospitals 
1977  12  66  I  78  I  0.64  I  2.11  2.75 
Geriatric hospitals 
1977  45  40  85  I  0.53  0.29  0.82 
I 
Doctors 
The  fees paid  to doctors are determined  annually by  national  commissions, 
consisting of  equal  representation of the doctors,  the sickness  funds  and  the 
institutions providing care.  The  agreed  fees  can be  accepted or rejected by 
each member  of the profession.  If within 30  days,  the doctor does not  signify 
objection to the  proposed  level of fees it is assumed  that he  agrees.  Any 
agreement  can  be  imposed  by  the Minister if 604 of the profession in the 
region  accept  it.  If no  such  agreement  is reached a  commission  may  review the 
situation and  impose  a  level of fees.  The  agreed  fees are the basis for 
social  insurance  reimbursement  but  may  be  less than the fees charged by  the 
physicians. 
The  doctor stock  in Belgium  1960,  1970  and  1975 
Total Number 
Number  per  100  000  population 
Number  of medical  school 
graduates 
1960 
11  380 
125 
<609  in 
1965/66 
1970  1975 
14  991  17  983 
155  176 
748  227 
As  can  be  seen  from  the table the doctor stock has  grown  quite rapidly.  The 
number  of medical  school  graduates rose  from  609  in 1965-66  to  1  227  in 1975. 
Hospital  beds 
The  table lists some  of the characteristics of the  Belgian hospital stock and 
indicates that about  65X  of general hospital beds are  in private 
establishments,  most  of which  are non-profit making.  The  characteristic of 
both the private and  the public hospital sector is that the units are small. - 31  -
The  average  length of stay for  acute cases  1n  1962  was  12.9 days.  lt went  up 
to  1~.2 days  in  1968  and  down  to  12.6 days  in 1976. 5i
plE il !l A R K
Adoinistrat ive Stnrcture
The respcnsi.bility for finrneir-g a;ro providing health care in Denmark is
divided amongst three leveis of government: central, county and municipality.
The f reedom of local government ,.rni cs is c ircumscribed by central government
Iegislation. The central governrnent determines uhich services wiIl be Provided
by local government arrd alEo often jetermines the quantity and quality of
provision.
Regional and natienal government prcvides care and rehabilitation for
alcoholics, epilepties, the blinct and the deaf. In time central Sovernment
uilI  eontrol only the Copenhagen ijniversity hospital (the most'specialized  unit
in Denmarkr the Finsen Institute, and the national diagnostic microbiological
eentre.
The relationship betueen the eoverrunent and doctors is governed by several
bodies. Each county aF.points a r:oc,mittee of four to six members uhose
objective iE to facilitate cooperation and coordination between physicians,
hospitals and the other health and uelfare services. In addition there is a
Central Negotiation Committee of Eeven councillors  which is resPonsible for the
conclusion of agreements uith the prcfessional  bodies of doctors; dentists and
other health care professions.  Ttrese agreements have to be confirrned by the
HiniEtry of Social Affairs.  The supervision of the interPretation of these
agreements is carried out by a committee consisting of three members of the
Central Negotiation Conrmittee and three representatives of the Danish l{edical
profession. Similar machinery has been created for some of the other health
professions.  l,lhere the parties fail  to a8ree, arbitration machinery takes over
and its decision is binding on both parties. tlhilst teneral practitioners are
in private practice, hospital physicians are toverrilnent emPloyees.
As the Ministry of the Interior is eoncerned lartely trith the suPervision of
Ioca} and regional government  nrost of the health care system is in its dooain.
The l'linistry of social Af f airs Ls involved in the regulat ion of Prof essional
fees and the provision of health care senrices uhich have not, as Yet, devolved
to local government.  Neither of lhese ininistries employs members of the health
professions. All professicnal advise is provided by the National Hea1th
Serviee. This institution is direeted by a doctor ard offers health care
advise to all  the ministries  and the local government authorities involved in
the planning, organization and management of the health service.
Coverate
Since 1973 the coverage ,sf the Danish health care system has been 1002. There
are two membership categori.es. G:"oup t membership entitles the Person to
eomprehensive health care at almost zero cost.  Group 2 membership entitles the
person to get free hospital care, lirnited reimbursements for Prioary care ard a
free choice of doctor in primary tare.  The dividing line betueen the two tyPes
of membens used to be defined hy a means test but since April 1 9?6 there haE
been a eompLete free choice betueen Grolrp t  and Group 2 membership. In October
1977 91 . 42 had Gnotrp t memberr,hip.
There is a private health care insurance market. This is declining in
impor^tanee as the size of the partial iy covered cat€gory declines.- 33  -
Private health hospitals are  regulated closely by  the  government  which  usually 
finances  much  of  the  care which  is given. 
The  Danish  health care  system  :s  t~x  fina~!Ced.  The  counties can  levy  a 
proportional  income  tax at whatever  rate they think necessary.  The  use  of  the 
other  local  taxation  instrument,  the  land  tax,  is limited by  agricultural 
pressure groups  and  the maximum  tax rate that can be  levied  is  2%  of the value 
of the  estate. 
The  central government  uses a  system  of grants to equalize and  supplement  local 
resources.  The  grant  system  is based  on  a  notion of  'demands  and  needs'.  A 
forumla  which  incorporates population,  age  structure,  and  load variables is 
used  to provide block  grants to  the  local authorities.  In  1976/77 
approximately  ~et of  the  counties'  expenditure was  met  by  such  block grants. 
Danish  central  government  can  control  local government  expenditure on  healthc 
are  in at  least  two  ways.  Firstly it can control the  level of the  'block 
grant'  to affect  local  spending  power.  Secondly  it can  control the entry of 
doctors  into  the health service  by restricting the number  of available 
established posts for general practitioners and  hospital doctors. 
Primary  care  is provided  by  general practitioners,  the majority of whom  are 
either in  joint practice or a  group  practice.  Some  practices have  auxiliary 
personnel  work  in them. 
Pharmaceutical  products are provided  by  a  privately owned  system of pharmacies 
and  drug  prices are regulated.  The  patient pays  up  to 504  of the cost of 
pharmaceutical  products depending  on  the category of drug. 
Doctors 
The  fees  paid  to general  practitioners are on  a  capitation basis with 
additional  fees  paid  for certain types of service and  out-of-hours care.  The 
hospital doctor  is paid  a  salary.  Doctor remuneration is negotiated  in the 
administration machinery  outlined above. 
Hospitals are  financed  out  of taxation. - 34  -
F R A N C E 
Administrative Structure 
At  the  national  level  the Ministry  is 1nvolved  in  the central planning of 
hospitals,  the subsidization of schemes,  the fixing of doctors fees and  pricing 
of pharmaceuticals.  Each  of the  16  regions and  95  departments,  plus  4  overseas 
departments of France  are  involved  to a  certain extent  in the finance  and 
provision of health care. 
Coverage 
France  does  not  have  one  system of social  insurance for health care.  However, 
the affect  of the general  and  specific schemes  is such that the schemes  cover 
98%  of the population. 
Sickness Funds 
The  majority of  the population  <all salaried workers  in  industry and  trade>  -
over  75%  - are compelled  to  join the National  Sickness  Insurance Fund. 
The  administrative structures of the  funds  vary.  The  National Sickness 
Insurance Fund  is directly supervised  by  the Ministry of Health  and  the 
Ministry of Finance.  At  the regional  level  there are sixteen regional sickness 
insurance  funds  which  carry out  a  variety of functions.  The  local or primary 
funds  are  financially autonomous.  Where  convenient their area coincides with 
that of the Department.  These  funds  are responsible for the initial 
registration of members  and  dispense benefits.  The  primary  funds  may  have 
local  br~nches which  serve particular areas. 
Private associations,  limited companies  and  the mutual  societies provide· 
additional  health  c~re cover.  These  companies  provide  insurance against risks 
which  are  only partly covered  by  the national  system. 
The  public assistance aspects of health care administered after a  means  test, 
provide  health care for a  small  proportion of the population  <2%>  who  have  no 
social  insurance rights. 
Theoretically the  sickness funds  have  to balance  income  and  expenditure by 
estimating costs and  income  in future periods.  The  contribution rates of the 
insured are  fixed  by  the government  in consultation with the sickness funds. 
The  funds  finance  the  payment  of the hospitals and  indirectly the payment  of 
the  health professions  Cdoctors,  nurses,  pharmacists,  midwives,  dentists, 
physiotherapists,  etc.>  and  the drug bills of the  insured. 
Contributions 
A contribution rate for those  in the general scheme  is levied on  wages  up  to an 
earnings ceiling fixed  annually by  decree.  Employers  contribute approximately 
12~ and  employees  3%.  The  contributions are paid to  finance  benefits in cash 
and  in  kind  in cases of sickness,  disablement  and  death.  The  contribution rate 
to  the  special  schemes  differ from  those  of  the  general  scheme.  Central 
government  regulates  investment  in new  hospital facilities according  to 
criteria associated  with  regional  dj_sparities  in hospital bed  endowments. 
Public hospitals can  borrow  money  on  the  open  market  and  can  acquire subsidies 
from  central  government.  They  cannot,  however,  make  a  profit. - 35  -
Benefits 
The  extent of the benefits is comprehensive  and  there is no  time  limit on  them. 
Once  a  patient decides to visit a  doctor his behaviour  is regulated by  a  code 
of practice which  lays down  basic principles for  liberal medicine  in France  -
freedom  of the patient to choose  his doctor,  freedom  of the doctor to 
prescribe,  medical  confidentiality, direct payment  of fees by  the patient to 
the doctor.  Typically a  patient will choose  which  doctor to visit, will pay 
him  the appropriate fee directly,  and  obtain reimbursement  in part about  a 
fortnight  later from  the office of the local  insurance  fund. 
The  insured's participation in the cost of treatment varies according to the 
type  of  treatment and  the standard of benefit received.  The  1987 rates are  30~ 
of the cost of most  pharmaceutical products and  25%  of the cost of visits, 
consultations and  other services provided  by  doctors and  other medical  staff 
outside hospitals,  20~ of the costs of practitioners and  tests in public and 
private institutions,  20%  of the costs of short-term hospitalization in public 
and  private institutions,  and  zero  for maternity and  major  surgery. 
Free health care is provided under certain circumstances: 
if the  insured or his dependents are hospitalized for more  than 30  days or 
if they undergo  major  surgery; 
when  the  insured  person is in receipt of supplementary  benefit; 
if the  insured obtains an  orthopaedic appliance of a  specified nature; 
if the  person is in receipt of a  sickness benefit established list on  the 
advice  of the Medical  High  Committee  or has  a  prolonged  and  expensive 
illness; 
recipients of an  invalidity pension or an  old-age pension paid to an  invalid 
after his 60th birthday; 
those  in receipt of industrial accident benefits who  are certified at not 
less than  66  2/3%  incapable of work. 
These  exemptions  apply even  if the recipient is in work  and  they  extend  to his 
dependents. 
Generally  the patient pays the doctor and  then is reimbursed  in part or in 
whole  depending  on  the characteristics,  by  the  local office or in the sickness 
fund  of which  he  is a  member.  Hospitals are paid directly by  the funds  with 
contributions from  patients as  indicated above. 
The  level of fees paid to doctors for work  outside hospital is regulated by  a 
national agreement.  At  present the majority of such doctors  in the community 
are parties to the fee  conventions,  i.e.  they charge  the agreed  fees.  A 
minority of the profession  <less than  5%>  are not  covered  by  the conventions 
and  ch~rge higher fees.  Also,  highly qualified doctors who  are parties to the 
conventions  may  charge  higher fees.  Patients receiving treatment  from  such 
doctors get  75%  to  100~ of the agreed  convention  fee  and  pay  any  excess out  of 
their own  resources. - 36  -
Private  insurance 
Private  insurance  cover  is used  to part-finance medical  care provided  under  the 
social  insurance scheme  but  not  fully  reimoursed  under  this scheme. 
About  50%  of those  who  are compelled  to be  members  of sickness insurance funds 
are also registered with a  private  insurer. 
Hospitals 
If the community  doctor refers the patient to hospital,  the patient may  get 
treatment  in either a  public hospital or a  recognised private hospital. 
Hospital  treatment  is provided  by  doctors different from  those  who  do  the 
initial diagnoses outside the hospital.  This,  and  the opportunity to acquire 
specialist treatment outside hospitals,  provides opportunities for duplication 
of diagnosis.  Post-hospital care is provided  in nursing homes  and  in the 
private home  and  the reimbursement  conditions are the same  as those for 
hospitals.  The  costs of nursing care  in the community  are reimbursed  in the 
same  way  as  the costs of primary  care. 
Hospital  beds  are provided  by  a  variety of  institutional arrangements:  public 
institutions,  private non-profit making  institutions,  and  private profit making 
institutions  <largely owned  and  operated by  doctors and  usually smaller than 
public hospitals>.  The  public hospital  system  is structured and  has four 
layers.  There  are about  900  public hospitals. 
Doctors 
The  fees paid to doctors who  work  outside the hospital are governed  by  the 
national agreement.  Each  treatment mode  is assigned a  key  letter and 
coefficient which  determines the payment  level,  i.e.  the doctor is paid by 
performance  or  fee  per  item  of service.  Doctors  in public hospitals are paid 
in relation to the number  and  nature of medical  acts that they perform.  This 
remuneration  is fixed at a  level between  a  minimum  and  a  maximum  and  tends to 
equate  payment  rates.  However,  from  the  legal point of view,  they cannot  be 
regarded  as salaried. - 37  -
G E R M A N Y 
Administrative Structure 
There  is a  tripartite administrative structure of the health care sector in the 
FR  of Germany.  The  Federal Ministry of Youth,  Family  and  Health Affairs and 
the Federal Ministry of Labour  and  Social Affairs concern  themselves with  the 
general  supervision of the health care system.  The  next tier is the state 
Ministry of Work  and  Social Welfare  which  is responsible for the enforcement  of 
the  law  and  regulations of the state,  which  is responsible for administering 
the health services.  The  lowest  administrative authorities are the  local 
authority health boards,  which  are  in charge  of caring for specific groups 
<e.g.  the handicapped,  the chronic sick,  addicts,  etc.>,  provide specific 
services  <school  health,  public health and  sanitary inspection>  and  supervise 
all hospitals. 
The  sickness funds  are grouped  into  8  state and  1  national federation.  They 
are self-governing bodies with  a  board  of directors and  an  assembly  of 
representatives who  are chosen  from  the  insured  and  employers.  The  funds 
provide  roughly  the  same  range of benefits.  Those  people who  are not covered 
by  the social  insurance scheme  and  who  are without private  insurance cover or 
the means  to buy  health care,  are eligible for benefits under social security, 
which  is means  tested,  and  can meet  the full cost of care.  It covers about  1'-
of the population and  is administered  by  each state. 
The  majority of the population  - some  90X  - are members  of a  social  insurance 
fund.  All  workers  below  an  earnings ceiling are compelled  to join the health 
care social  insurance scheme. 
Those  not  covered  by  social  insurance  and  the social aid prov1s1on  of the state 
have  to depend  on  private  insurance  and  private resources.  This together with 
the  fact  that  those  covered  by  social  insurance  can  'supplement'  their State 
benefits from  private  income,  mens  that there is a  substantial private 
insurance market  for health care. 
The  unemployed's  contributions are paid for him  by  the unemployment  scheme. 
Pensioners are obliged  to be  registered with sickness funds.  However  their 
health care  insurance  is free only  if they were  insured with the statutory 
social  insurance scheme  for at least half the period between  1.1.1950 and  their 
request  for retirement.  Those  not meeting this criterion have  to pay 
contributions if they  wish  to receive health care benefits.  The  criterion 
which  determines contribution and  membership  is the  level of remuneration. 
Workers  earning  in excess of the ceiling can  become  voluntary members  of the 
social  insurance  scheme. 
Finance 
The  system  is financed  from  five  sources:  compulsory  sickness funds,  <the 
principle source>  private  insurance organizations,  pr1vate voluntary 
organizations,  public  funds,  and  private resources.  The  sickness funds  have  to 
try to balance  income  and  expenditure by  estimating the cost  in future periods 
and  adjusting,  subject to government  agreement,  the contribution rates of  the 
insured.  The  funds  finance hospital and  primary  care by  contracting with the 
providers and  fina~cing them  directly. - 38  -
Contributions by  the  insured 
Contribution rates vary between  the eight groups  of sickness funds  from 
approximately  7.0 to  15X and  this levy  is divided equally between  the employer 
and  the employee.  These  contributions finance  benefits in kind  <health care> 
and  in cash  <sickness,  maternity and  deaf benefits>.  Contributions to the 
finance  of health care  come  from  the state and  the central government.  The 
latter contributes to maternity  insurance and  subsidizes the schemes  for mine 
workers,  pensioners special  insured groups  <e.g.  students and  the armed 
forces>. 
The  Central  and  State governments  have  become  increasingly involved  in measures 
aimed  at meeting  the deficits of the hospital service and  improving  the quality 
and  geographical distribution of hospital facilities.  The  flow  of government 
resources  into the health care system has risen rapidly  in the recent past. 
Private  insurance  is used  to finance  the expenditure of those with no  social 
insurance cover.  About  5~ with compulsory  social  insurance cover elect to have 
'superior'  treatment  <e.g.  hospital accommodation  in small  wards  or private 
rooms>.  Those  covered  by  social  insurance get benefits in kind  <i.e.  there is 
no  third party pays  system  as in France>  and  direct contributions by  patients 
towards  treatment costs are  limited.  The  insured pay  a  nominal  amount  per item 
for pharmaceutical  products and  spectacles  <children and  veterans are exempt>. 
The  insured  also pays  part of the cost of appliances and  for some  types of 
dental care.  The  latter change  was  introduced as part of a  cost-cutting 
exercise  in 1977  together with changes  which  resulted  in the non- reimbursement 
of certain minor  medicines. 
In the event of illness the patient can  choose  his doctor freely.  The  patient 
can  also seek medical  advice  from  a  specialist registered with a  fund. 
All  doctors can  conclude  a  contract with a  sickness fund  to provide care for 
patients covered  by  social  insurance.  This relationship,  between  the fund,  the 
doctor and  the patient,  is regulated by  federal  law.  There  is at least one 
doctors'  federation  in each  state.  All doctors treating sickness fund  members 
are obliged to meet  the health care demands  of fund  members. 
As  proof of fund  membership  and  as evidence  of his right to claim free 
treatment,  the patient must  hand  over a  medical  voucher at the first 
consultation.  These  vouchers are  issued to the  insured by  the funds  and 
entitle the holder to claim the services of a  doctor for three months.  If the 
patient is deemed  to be  in need  of hospital care this usually  involves 
in-patient treatment.  Out-patient hospital facilities in Germany  are unusual 
although efforts are being made  to alter this aspect of health care provision. 
Hospital  treatment  financed  by  the  funds  can be  carried out only  in recognized 
hospitals,  which  have  contracts with the funds.  Once  in hospital the patients' 
ailment  - if necessary  - may  be  diagnosed  anew:  a  wasteful duplication of 
doctors'  time  and  testing procedures. 
Hospitals 
The  hospital  system  is structured on  a  state basis  ~1d hospital care is 
provided  in a  variety of  institutional settings.  With  regard to acute care, 
the state and  local  governments  own  about  50%  of beds  and  40~ of hospitals.  A 
further  40%  of hospital beds  and  40%  of hospitals are owned  by  voluntary 
bodies.  Other hospitals which  unite TB,  chronic sick,  psychiatric and - 39  -
handicapped  cases,  etc. ,  are  owned  1n  a  similar pat ter·n.  Pr  1 vate  uru b,  t t-'nJ  t ,_, 
be  numerous  but  small  and  the bulk  of the care takes place  in state  an~ 
voluntary hospitals. 
Doctol"S 
Doctors  <specialists and  GPs  in the primary care sector>  are paid a  fee  per 
item  of service.  In  the case of doctors working  for the sickness funds,  the 
fees are determined  by  negotiations between  the funds  and  the doctors' 
federations.  The  structure of hospital doctors'  pay  varies according to 
ownership  of the hospital.  Doctors working  in public hospitals are generally 
paid  a  salary and  senior doctors can  do  private work.  The  same  payment  system 
operates  in voluntary hospitals.  In private unit fees are charged  by  the 
doctor and  paid by patients. 
Not  only  is the doctor stock  in the FR  of Germany  high by  European  and  indeed 
world  standards,  its rate of growth  is rapid.  Since  1972  a  numerus  clausus has 
provided  a  means  of controlling the supply of doctors. - 40  -
I  T A L Y 
Administrative Structure 
The  old  health care scheme,  provided  by  200  sickness funds  and  g1v1ng  limited 
coverage  to most  of  the population is being replaced by  a  comprehensive 
national health service.  This process of replacement  is incomplete  and,  as a 
result,  the Italian health care system  is complex. 
Three  central government  ministries are  involved  in the running of the health 
service  in Italy.  The  Ministry of Health regulates the provision of health 
care by  the regions,  provinces and  municipalities and  allocates finance  to  the 
regional  authorities.  The  Ministry of Public Works  controls the finance  of  new 
hospital construction except  in the South  where  there is a  special agency. 
Government  subsidies for health care are provided  by  the Ministry of Health and 
the  economic  ministries. 
The  next  layer of administration is the regions,  of which  there are  20,  varying 
in  population  from  100  000  to 8  million,  with the power  to create and  implement 
laws  provided  they do  not  contravene the Constitution or the  'fundamental'  laws 
of central government.  The  regions  finance  <from  central government  subsidies> 
preventive health care services,  a  school  medical  service,  vaccination and  the 
training of auxiliary health personnel,  and  they distribute subsidies from  the 
National  Hospital  Fund  to local hospitals. 
There  are  94  provinces  in Italy and  few  have  much  political power.  The  main 
health care  function of the provinces is to ensure  that the municipalities are 
able  to  provide health and  welfare services and  to provide care for psychiatric 
patients,  to manage  the public health laboratories,  and  to care for the 
unemployed  with  TB.  In some  ways  their role is duplicated by  the 
municipalities,  of which  there are about  8  900.  They  provide preventative 
services  <e.g.  vaccination,  the school health services>,  clinics for municipal 
doctors  and  midwives. 
Sickness funds 
Legislation passed  in 1974  and  1977  will result in the abolition of the 
sickness funds  and  their replacement  by  a  'national health service'  financed  by 
earmarked  taxation and  provided  by  the Regional  authorities and  the 
professions.  This reform  is being  implemented  gradually and  at present the 
funds  continue to operate as agents of the State in collecting insurance 
contributions and,  to a  limited extent,  as providers. 
Coverage  will be  complete  when  the  1974-77  legislation is replaced by  the 
National  Health Service.  This replacement  is still being debated  by  the 
Italian Parliament. 
Private  insurance  for health care is offered by  four companies.  Religious 
organizations are  important  in providing care  <nursing  services>  and  facilities 
<private hospitals>. 
Nominally  coverage  is complete  but  the prov1s1on  of facilities is very  unequal 
and  so  coverage  in different parts of the country can  mean  radically different 
things with  regard  to access to quality and  quantity of health care. - 41  -
Finance 
The  funds  collect contributions and  use  part of this revenue  to  pay  doctors and 
pharmacists.  The  rest of the revenue  is paid  to  the Ministry of Health which 
allocates these  funds  to the regions who  are responsible  for  the  finance  and 
provision of the hospital services. 
This allocation is a  matter of dispute:  there is no  agreed  formula  as yet and 
allocations appear to be  made  on  an  ad  hoc  basis with regions able to meet 
deficits by  extensive borrowing  on  the capital market. 
Contributions 
The  insured person pays  a  contribution rate of approximately  0.5~ of his 
earnings.  The  employers  contribution rate varies from  one  economic  sector to 
another. 
In the three schemes  for the self-employed a  fixed  amount  is paid by  the 
central government  for  each  insured person.  At  the moment,  until the National 
Health Service scheme  is passed,  there are no  substantial changes  in the 
government  finance  of health care. 
The  National  Hospital  fund  finances hospital care for insured people.  The 
responsibility for this task was  transferred from  the sickness funds  to the 
Regional  Authorities.  A proportion of all sickness fund  contributions paid by 
employers  and  all other subsidies from  other minor  institutions,  municipalities 
and  provinces,  are paid to the National  Hospital  fund  for distribution to the 
regions. 
Benefits 
All  benefits supplied under  social  insurance for health care are free of 
charge. 
The  benefits of the health care  insurance scheme  consist of benefits in kind. 
The  benefits are comprehensive  in principle and  there are no  time  limits. 
The  providers,  doctors,  pharmacists and  nurses,  have  agreements  with the funds 
to provide services at given prices.  The  doctors working  in the community  are 
paid on  a  capitation fee basis whilst hospital specialists are paid senerally 
on  a  part-time or salary basis. 
The  patient has  a  free  choice of doctor provided  the one  used  is contracted to 
the  fund.  The  patient may  visit a  general practitioner or a  specialist, 
although access to the latter is usually regulated by  the general practitioner. 
The  fees paid are regulated by  a  national agreement  between  the providers and 
the financiers.  Doctors are usually in solo practices,  although some  group 
practices with general and  specialized physicians together.  The  extension of 
group  practice is favoured  by  the government. 
Hospitals 
The  reform  of the health-care system  has also affected hospital finance. 
Private hospitals are  financed  on  a  daily-rate system as they were  prior to the 
reform.  However,  public hospitals are given budgets  and  encouraged  to operate 
within the budget  constraints. - 42  -
The  hospital bed  stock of Italy grew  from  9. 75  beds  per  1  000  populat  1or1  u1 
1965  to  10.58 per  1  000  population  in 1975.  Over  804 of the bed  stock  is  ~n 
public hospitals.  The  rest is in private institutions,  many  of which  are run 
by  religious orders.  The  average  occupancy  rate is around  804. 
One  of  the  primary  objectives of the new  Italian health-care system  is to 
achieve  a  more  equitable division of resources between  the regions of the 
country. 
Doctors 
Prior to the recent  reform of the Italian health-care system many  doctors were 
paid  on  a  fee per item  of service basis.  As  a  result of the recent reforms 
non-hospital doctors are paid on  a  capitation basis and  the  level of capitation 
fee  is regulated by  national conventions.  Hospital doctors  in public 
institutions are paid on  a  salary basis with those having  part-time contracts 
supplementing their income  with private practice fees. 
The  doctor stock has grown  rapidly because of a  policy of open  entry to medical 
schools  <all  those who  matriculate have  the right to the higher education of 
their choice>. 
This  growth  of an  already  large doctor stock is uncontrolled and  likely to 
create problems  for  Italy and  other members  of the EEC. - 43  -
I  R E L A N D 
Administrative Structure 
The  Department  of Health  in Dublin supervises the operation of the  Irish Health 
service and  carries out  a  long  term  planning function. 
The  task of administering the day-to-day running of the Irish health service 
has been  devolved to eight Health Boards.  These  bodies consist of  local 
authority elected members,  who  are  in the majority,  and  representatives of the 
medical  and  ancillary health professions.  The  latter are elected by  the 
professions,  although the first representatives were  appointed by  the Minister. 
The  Boards  coordinate their activities with the  local authorities and  the 
voluntary health bodies.  The  work  of the Boards  is divided  into three broad 
programmes  covering respectively community  care services,  general hospital 
services,  and  'special'  hospital services  <for the mentally ill, the mentally 
handicapped  and  geriatrics>. 
The  community  care  component  of  each Board's work  covers preventive health 
activities,  general practitioner services,  social workers,  dental services,  and 
public health nursing services.  These  services are administered at the  local 
government  level.  Various  local committees of the Board  keep  it in touch with 
local opinion. 
Finance 
Over  500  000  people  are covered  by  private health care  insurance provided by 
the monopoly,  Voluntary Health  Insurance  Board. 
Health care  is financed  by  general taxation.  There  is a  very small 
contribution paid by  those  in the  limited eligibility category.  There  is no 
payment  by  employers.  Charging is limited to pharmaceutical products. 
The  major  type of  expenditure  is hospital care:  over 60%  of the population get 
no  general  practitioner service from  the government  service. 
The  amount  of priva:e  expenditure  is clearly quite substantial as the majority 
of the  population have  no  primary care cover and  15'- of the population 
<generally  the  mo~t affluent>  are outside the  limited and  full eligibility 
categories. 
Benefits 
The  30~ of the population who  are card holding members  of the General  Medical 
Service  <GMS>  get  a  ~ide range of health care benefits.  The  card holder can 
apply  to register  ~i~h a  General  Practitioner.  Once  accepted by  the physician 
the  ca~ holder  is E:igible for the same  services as provided  for private 
fee-paying patients.  Most  doctors  in the west  practice alone,  but  in the east 
group  practices are  ~ore common.  The  card covers the cost of all prescribed 
pharmaceutical  prcdu=ts made  up  by  pharmacists who  are members  of the  GMS.  The 
card  holder is  el:gi:l~ for free out-patient and  in-patient care,  provided  the 
l~tte~ is  in a  pu~1:: ward.  Hospital care can  be  provided  in any  Health Board 
hospital  or any  c~~~~ approved  hospital.  Home  nursing services are available 
for all card  holde~.  particularly the elderly.  In theory free dental care  is 
available,  but  in  ~~=~tice such care is often absent due  to a  shortage of 
dPnti=ts. - 44  -
Those  with  limited eligibility status get  no  general pract1t1one1·  benef1t~ ft•om 
the government  schemes.  They  are  eligible for free  in-patient hospital. 
treatment  in a  public ward  and  free out-patient treatment  if the patient is 
referred by  a  doctor.  The  hospital used  by  thi5 group  of patients must  be  a 
Health Board  approved  institution.  Those  people  who  opt  for private or 
semi-private hospital  treatment get  only part of the cost of such care.  The 
balance must  be  paid by  the patient or with benefits derived  from  the 
membership  of the Voluntary  Health  Insurance Scheme.  The  costs of 
pharmaceutical  products are covered  in part for those  in the Limited 
Eligibility Scheme  and  free maternity and  infant welfare benefits are provided. 
The  Voluntary  Health  Insurance scheme  offers two  main  types of policy:  a  policy 
for hospital costs and  an  optional policy to cover non-hospital bills. 
Hospital fees 
Health Board  hospitals are  financed  out of general taxation on  a  budget  basis. 
The  Voluntary  Hospitals are paid  on  a  budget  basis. 
Doctors 
General  practitioners  in the  GMS  are paid by  the Health Boards  on  a  basis of a 
fee  per patient contract.  Hospital doctors employed  by  the Health Boards  are 
paid a  salary.  Those  doctors working  in the Voluntary hospitals are paid on  a 
sessional basis for out-patient clinics and  under  a  'pool'  system  for 
in-patients.  Pool  payments  are payments  per day  for each  public patient 
treated  in the hospital.  The  'pool'  of these payments  for each  hospital is 
divided  betw~en the  consultants on  an  agreed  basis. - 45  -
L U X E M 8  0  U R G 
Administrative Structure 
The  health-care system  of Luxembourg  is under  the supervision of the Ministry 
of Labour  and  Social Security. 
Sickness Funds 
There  are five  funds  for salaried employees  and  two  for wage  earners.  The 
funds  are managed  by  elected committees consisting of representatives of the 
insured  and  the  employers.  The  funds  operate under a  central committee  which 
has  the power  to regulate the  funds  and  negotiate fees with health care 
providers.  The  committees consist of the presidents and vice-presidents of all 
the sickness funds  in Luxembourg. 
All  active workers,  all those  in receipt of,  a  pension or an  annuity,  and  all 
dependents  of  instJred  members  are covered  by  compulsory health care  insurance. 
This means  that  99~ of the population are covered  by  health care  insurance. 
The  small  number  of people  who  are not  covered by  the  legislation are eligible 
for benefits under  the means-tested Social Security programme. 
Contributions 
Wage  and  salary earners have  to pay  equal  contributions of approximately  2%  of 
gross  earnings up  to  four  times the national minimum  wage  to finance  in-kind 
benefits  <cash  be~efits are  financed  by  an  additional contribution>.  The 
contribution rates of  employers  or pension funds  is the same  as that of 
employees  or  pensio~ers.  Three  systems  for mutual  financial assistance have 
been  established.  One  of these  is concerned  with  in-kind benefits and  the 
result  is that any  fund  with a  surplus pays it to funds  in deficit. 
The  g0vernment  pays  50%  of the administrative costs of the sickness funds  and 
pays  subsidies particularly in the case of congenital malformations and  costly 
illnesses.  Also  the  government  pays the costs of confinements and  meets  any 
deficits  in pensioner contributions when  such contributions do  not  cover the 
costs of health care. 
Private  insurance 
The  role of private health care  insurance  in Luxembourg  is small and  concerned 
with  supplementing  s~cial insurance benefits.  The  expenditure of the private 
sector is equal  to  about  2%  of the total cost of health care  in. 
Benefits 
The  patient pays  the doctor and  is reimbursed  by  the sickness fund.  For 
medical  consultat:or5 the patient is reimbursed  95%  of the cost,  and  for a  home 
visit by  a  doctor  is reimbursed  80%  of the cost.  Hospital care is free  except 
for  o daily  contr:~~~ion for accommodation  of approximately  170  BF  paid  by  the 
sickness  fund.  ['rt;.g::  are  reimbursed  in three different categories.  Certain 
miner  drugs  are  r.::-r.-;eimbursable,  most  are reimbursed  80%  and  expensive drugs 
or drugs  for  th~  c~~~nic sick  100%.  Drugs  for hospital  in-patients are free. 
Services are  Frov:·~.:-:  for  the  insured  by  doctors and  hospitals which  are 
covered  by  obliga:c~y contracts with the funds.  This care  includes general  and 
specialist care,  ~c~~italization,  laboratory services,  maternity services, 
denta1  care~  c:tppl:.:.~:es,  transport  and  pharmaceutical costs. - 46  -
Hospital beds 
Hospitals  in Luxembourg  are approximately  60'- publicly owned  and  40'- privately 
owned.  The  government  controls hospital  expansion  and  a  national plan exists. 
Doctors 
Doctors are paid on  a  fee per  item of service basis and  the fees are negotiated 
between  the central committee  and  the doctors'  association.  The  exceptions are 
hospital doctors  in the central hospital  in Luxembourg  who  are employed 
directly by  the hospital on  a  salary basis. 
Specialists generally work  in private practices.  There  is no  medical  school  in 
the country. - 47  -
N E T H E R L A N D S 
Administrative Structure 
The  administration of  the social  insurance health care system  is decentralized 
and  in the hands  of sickness funds.  The  government's role  in health care  is 
limited to the regulation and  approval  of fees for doctors and  hospitals,  the 
planning of the system  and  the regulation and  approval  of the contribution 
rates to the  funds.  The  minister determines the premium  for health  insurance 
on  the advice of the Sickness Funds  Council.  The  Minister can  veto agreements 
made  by  the  funds  and  approved  by  the Sickness Funds  Council,  but this is rare. 
Sickness Funds 
All  sickness funds  are supervised by  the Sickness Funds  Council,  made  up  of 36 
members  <equal  representation of the sickness funds  organizations,  health care 
providers,  employees,  employers  and  nominees  of the Minister of Social Affairs 
and  Public Health>.  The  general  scheme  is administered by  71  sickness funds 
federated  into four national organizations.  The  federations combine  to form 
the  Joint Association of Sickness Funds,  e.g.  to negotiate doctors'  fees.  The 
heavy  risks social  insurance programme  is administered by  the sickness funds, 
by  private insurers and  by  public  law  bodies entrusted with the health care 
protection of civil servants.  All  three sets of bodies are supervised by  the 
Sickness Funds  Council. 
An  independent  Prevention Fund  is concerned  largely with research and  shares 
out  resources for various preventive medicine  institions.  These  monies  are 
paid  to it by  the bodies administering the general scheme  and  the heavy  risks 
scheme. 
The  Cross  organizations provide nursing services and  are  important  in 
organizing preventive care.  There  are three Cross organization  <Green, 
White-Yellow  and  Orange-Green>.  11  out  of  13  million Dutch  citizens are 
covered  by  these organizations and  they are funded  out of subscriptions 
<approximately  30%>  and  government  subsidies. 
General  scheme  benefits can  be  supplemented  with voluntary additional cover 
from  the sickness funds  and  with private  insurance.  The  30%  of the population 
who  are not  covered  by  the general scheme  buy  private care.  As  a  consequence 
the private health care  insurance market  is quite large. 
Coverage 
The  general  scheme  offers full coverage  and  membership  is compulsory  if the 
employee  is earning  less than a  specified amount.  As  a  result of this the 
scheme  covers  73%  of the population. 
The  heavy  risks programme  offers a  restricted list of benefits but covers  100% 
of the population. 
Contributions 
The  contributions to  the general  scheme  finance  benefits in kind.  The 
contribution rate for compulsory  members  of this scheme  is divided equally 
between  the  employer  and  the employee. 
The  contribution rates of the elderly  in this scheme  vary with  the  family 
income  of the contributor. - 48  -
Government  contributions to the cost of health care  in the Netherlands at·e 
substantial.  Central government  finance  flows  into the Cross  societies and 
related organizations.  The  provinces and  the municipalities also make  a 
substantial contribution  in the form  of subsidies. 
Benefits 
The  general  scheme  gives its members  the right to short-term medical, 
pharmaceutical,  dental,  hospital and  other types of care for the  insured and 
his/her dependents.  Every  insured person is required to register with a 
physician approved  by  the Fund  to which  he  belongs.  Most  general practitioners 
work  in solo practice although group  practice and  health centres are  increasing 
in number  and  are favoured  by  the government.  The  services of the doctor are 
provided  free  of charge  and  the doctor is paid directly by  the sickness funds 
on  a  capitation basis. 
Most  benefits under  the general social  insurance scheme  are provided  free of 
charge.  Also  patients admitted  to nursing homes  and  other facilities under  the 
heavy  risk programme  have  to contribute. 
Specialist care  is provided only after authorization by  the patient's general 
practitioner.  Specialist care may  be  provided  in hospital,  in an  out-patient 
clinic,  or  in  the specialist's premises. 
Dental  care  is obtained free of charge  for children under  four.  Other persons 
can  buy  a  treatment certificate at a  low  price,  which  is valid for six months 
and  entitles the  holder to free  <e.g.  fillings and  extractions>  or subsidized 
<e.g.  the  provision of  false teeth>  treatment.  60'- of the cost of providing 
false  teeth has  to be  paid by  the beneficiary. 
Pharmaceutical  products are dispensed  by  chemists  in urban areas and  by  doctors 
in some  rural areas.  All  drugs  and  dressings are provided  free of charge. 
Hospital  treatment  fer periods of up  to 365  days  is provided  free  of charge  for 
all general  scheme  fund  members. 
Those  not  covered  by  the general scheme  pay  for all the health care benefits 
listed above  out  of  their own  resources or by  private insurance.  However  all 
the population is insured against the cost of treatment  in nursing homes  and 
hospital care after the  365th day.  Under  the heavy  risks legislation nursing 
home  care for the  elderly and  the chronic sick for all the population is 
covered  from  the first day  as is care  in institutions for the physically and 
mentally handicapped. 
Hospitals 
The  hospitals are paid  by  the  insurers on  a  daily rate system.  The  Central 
Foundation  for Hospital Tariffs,  under  government  pressure has  exerted tight 
control  on  the  growth  of these rates.  The  government  is seeking to acquire 
great~r control  of hospital charges  for general  scheme  members  and  those  who 
are privately insured. 
Over  the  past  15  yea~s expenses  in the sickness  insurance sector have  tripled. 
According  to the  public health ministry expenses  increased  from  12  billion 
guilder  in  1971  to an  estimated  34  billion in 1987. - 49  -
The  Government's draft reform of sickness  insurance  includes a  general  'basic 
insurance'  to be  introduced  for all Dutch  citizens.  According  to this plan 
each  patient will  have  to pay  15'- of the doctor's bill himself.  The  main 
question  is whether  and  to what  extent this notion of  'basic  insurance'  is to 
be  implemented  for dental care as well. 
Doctors 
The  rate of medical  school output has been  regulated by  the government  <numerus 
clausus>. 
Doctors  involved  in primary  and  secondary care are paid on  a  capitation basis. 
The  capitation fees are nesotiated by  the doctors and  the Joint Association of 
Sickness Fund  Organization. - 50  -
U N I  T E D  K I  N G D 0  M 
Administrative Structure 
The  Secretary of State for Social Services is responsible for the National 
Health  System  <NHS>  in England.  In Scotland and  Wales  the respective 
Secretaries of State are responsible,  and  in Northern  Ireland it is the Health 
and  Social Services Board.  The  Secretaries of State set general guidelines 
concerning the provision of health care and  control the allocation of funds. 
The  structures in England  and  Scotland are separate,  but similar.  The  health 
service is administered at the regional  level by  14 Regional  Health Authorities 
<RHA>  in England.  Each  RHA  has  at  least one  medical  school  in its area,  and 
the  RHA's  role consists chiefly of  NHS  planning.  In carrying out this role 
they have  to coordinate their activities with and  allocate finance received 
from  the  DHSS  to each  of the Area  Health Authorities,  who  have  the statutory 
responsibility for running  the health services  in each  of the 90  English areas. 
There  are  Joint Consultative Committees  with Joint-Care Planning Teams 
responsible at this level  for  the coordination of  local government  <who  provide 
personal  social services>  and  AHA  activities. 
The  smallest administrative units are  the Districts serving,  on  average,  a 
population of  250  000.  These  units are responsible for delivering the full 
range  of health services  in the district and  have  a  general hospital's 
specialist  service~.  District boundaries  are  based  on  'natural'catchment 
areas. 
Sickness funds 
There  are  no  sickness  funds  involved  in the  finance  and  prov1s1on  of 
health-care social  insurance  in the United  Kingdom.  Since  1948  the  NHS  has 
been  available for  use  by  all residents  in the  UK. 
Private funds 
Private health-care  insurance covers about  two  million people and  the market  is 
dominated  by  the British United  Provident  Association,  the Private Patients' 
Plan,  and  the Western  Provident  Association  <non-profit making  bodies>. 
Several other bodies offer a  variety of  insurance policies but,  although the 
market  has become  more  competitive recently  <as  evidenced by  new  types of 
policies>,  the total market  size is relatively static. 
Income 
The  chief source of  finance  for the  NHS  is general taxation  <the  Consolidated 
Fund>.  Social  insurance contributions and  charges to patients produce  a  small 
proportion of the total.  These  characteristics of the  income  of the  NHS  have 
changed  little. 
Expenditure 
About  90'- of  NHS  expenditure  is budget  limited.  A cash allocation is made  out 
of  the national  budget  and  this  includes  an  allowance  for expected  increases  in 
costs during  the  year  and  a  small  allowance  for real growth.  These  cash  limits 
must  not  be  exceeded.  If costs rise more  than  expected,  the real growth  of the 
service  is curtailed unless greater efficiency  in  the use  of resources can  be 
achieved. - 51  -
Benefits 
Each  patient registers with a  general practitioner and  most  people do  not 
change  their registration unless they move  to a  different geographical area, 
although  the patient has the right to choose  and  change  general practitioner 
freely.  Most  general practitioners now  operate  in group practices and  the 
number  of health centres has grown  rapidly in the last 10  years,  as a  result of 
government  encouragement.  Health centres often provide medical  care  <provided 
by doctors and  nurses)  and  dental care.  The  patient's first point of contact 
with  the health-care system  is the general practitioner.  The  GP  can refer the 
patient to a  specialist who  is hospital based.  Out-patient and  in-patient care 
in hospitals is free of charge.  Access  to elective care  <cold  surgery>  is 
rationed by  time  <waiting  lists>,  the acutely ill, in theory,  gain access to 
care on  demand.  A patient's participation in the costs of care is limited.  A 
charge  is made  for pharmaceutical products and  there are charges also for 
dental care,  opthalmic care,  and  some  appliances.  All these charges are levied 
on  the more  affluent client groups  with those  in receipt of Supplementary 
Benefit,  the  aged,  the chronic sick,  expectant mothers  and  children being 
exempt  from  charging.  No  charges are made  for general practitioner visits or 
for hospitalization. 
General  practitioners and  pharmacists outside hospitals work  under contract 
with  the  local Family  Practitioner Committee  of the  AHA.  The  general 
practitioner is paid by  a  hybrid payment  system:  on  average  about  55~ of the 
general practitioner's income  is generated by  capitation fees,  the rest is 
derived  from  payments  for  items of service  <e.g.  vaccination and  maternity 
care>,  payments  related to age  <seniority payments>,  and  in some  cases payments 
related to  location  <designated area allowances>.  The  pharmacist  is paid for 
each  item  made  up  for patients. 
Hospitals 
Hospitals are  financed  out of  NHS  revenues by  the  AHAs  who  receive their monies 
from  the  RHAs  and  the  DHSS. 
Doctors 
Hospital doctors receive a  salary.  Junior hospital doctors often get 
substantial overtime  payments  which  can result  in their remuneration exceeding 
that of their superiors,  the consultants.  This outcome  is the result of more 
militant bargaining by  the junior hospital doctors.  Consultants are eligible 
to receive distinction award  supplements to their salary  <about  1  in 3  receive 
such  payments,  a  small  number  of which  can  double the consultant's 
remuneration>.  All  salary proposals emanate  from  the  independent  Review  Body 
on  Doctors  and  Dentists'  Remuneration.  Senior consultants may  augment  their 
income  in private practice outside of their NHS  obligations. 